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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to develop a comparative analysis 
of pension plans in the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum 
refining industries. Perspective is supplied by a brief history of 
industrial pension plans in the United States. The evolving legal 
status and extent of coverage is given particular attention. 
Problems connected with the size and control of pension funds are 
explored. The foundation upon which the comparative analysis rests 
is provided by a detailed examination of pension plan provisions 
as they appear in contemporary pension agreements. Attention is 
given to methods of administration; eligibility requirements for 
normal, early, special early, and disability retirement; benefit 
computation, and; financing arrangements. Pension plans cur­
rently in operation in the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum 
refining industries are compared on the basis of their provisions.
i
Pension plan benefits for the various types of retirement are 
computed with several hypothetical age, service, and earnings 
combinations. An attempt is made to point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of each plan. Developing trends in pension plan pro­
visions are discussed along with an evaluation of the long-run 
implications of these trends. Special attention is given to the 
problems connected with vesting provisions and the methods by which 
pension plans are financed.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Growth in privately financed pension plans in the last two decades
has been phenomenal. The increasing need for pension planning is
apparent to any casual observer of demographic, social, and economic
changes in our society.
Demographically, the older citizenry is growing faster than the
population at large. The most recent census (I960) shows that 16.6
million Americans were 65 or older. A year later, the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare set the figure at 17 mil-
2
lion, with an estimate of 19 million by 1965.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the labor force par­
ticipation rate of the aged is declining steadily. The unavoidable 
conclusion is that we will have more and more elderly citizens who are 
not gainfully employed, and therefore in need of some form of retirement 
income. The purpose of this study is to make a comparison of how this 
growing need is being provided for by several of the nation's major 
industries.
An understanding of this or any other topic requires a reasonably 
complete grasp of its background and terminology. Chapters II and III 
are therefore devoted to the development of what might be called a
^U. S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population,
1960, General Population Characteristics,. U. S. Summary, Final Report,
1961.
^U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, The Health 
Care of the Aged, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1962,
p. 1.
1
2minimal background necessary to an understanding of private pension 
plans and their provisions. Little will be found that is new or novel 
in these chapters. Such is not their purpose.
Several methods of providing for old age security are not con­
sidered in this work. No attempt is made to deal with systems and 
programs such as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), 
and related governmental programs. Nor are such programs as profit 
sharing plans, matching savings plans, stock purchase plans, or 
pension systems supported solely by employees, considered. Though 
all of these might provide retirement income, they are not negotiated 
pension plans as such, and therefore fall outside the scope of this 
study. Such systems are treated only as they are incidentally con­
nected with the negotiated pension plans under study.
Chapter II contains a brief historical sketch of private pension 
plan development in the United States. In addition to certain 
obvious historical facts, an attempt is made to show ways in which 
early practices and plans influenced present pension planning.
Chapter III is designed to provide an outline of pension plan 
provisions that are common to most plans. The purpose of this 
arrangement is twofold. First, the necessary terminology is de­
veloped. Second, a basis for comparison of pension plans is 
developed. Since the chief purpose of this study is to provide a 
comparative analysis of several pension plans, it is only logical 
that the comparison be on the basis of their provisions. Some 
indication will be given of the extent to which such provisions 
appear in contracts throughout the nation. Some provisions are
practically universal, while others are relatively rare. Certain 
variations will be discussed where the variation seems destined to 
become the rule in a significant portion of the nation's industry. 
Finally, some of the problems associated with each type of provision 
will be briefly discussed.
Chapter IV is the heart of this study. Pension plans in four 
major industries are examined and compared. The industries involved 
are the rubber industry, the steel industry, the automobile industry 
and the petroleum refining industry. As noted above, the comparison 
is on the basis of the.individual pension plan's provisions.
The plans analyzed were all negotiated by industrial unions. 
Most of them were chosen primarily on the basis of the extent of 
coverage, and perhaps more importantly, because they tend to be 
pattern setters. With the exception of the petroleum refining in­
dustry, there is a high degree of uniformity between plans within 
each industry studied. Four specific plans are therefore analyzed 
separately for the petroleum refining industry, while the automobile 
steel, and rubber industries are analyzed on an industry rather than 
on a firm-by-firm basis.
The study will be directed toward several questions concerning 
negotiated pension plans. In particular:
1. How extensive is the coverage of negotiated private 
pension plans?
2. What developing trends in pension plan provisions can 
be detected?
3. What are the long-run implications of these trends?
4. Are some type plans best suited to particular employer- 
employee relationships than others?
45. What is the future of private pension plans?
As indicated, the analysis contained herein deals with only a 
selected group of major plans. The following sources are available
to anyone interested in a plan not covered by this study. Information
available from each source is as indicated.
1. Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts, Bureau 
of National Affairs. The information contained herein 
is quite brief and distilled, with only the most perti­
nent facts of a plan noted. It is an excellent quick 
reference to such facts, however.
2. United States Department of Labor, Office of Labor- 
Management and Welfare-Pension Reports. Regional 
offices are scattered throughout the nation. These
offices have on file rather detailed information as
required by the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act of 1958. Under provisions of the Act, these files 
are open to the public, and contain the following 
kind of information on a plan:
a. Who is covered by the plani
b. A detailed description of the administration of 
the plan.
c. Copies of plan documents under which the plan was 
established and is operated.
d. The plans assets, liabilities, contributions, and 
benefits paid.
3. U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
bulletins. The Department of Labor regularly publishes 
bulletins dealing with particular labor problems. Well 
over 1,500 of these releases have been published, but an 
index is available so that those dealing with a partic­
ular topic is easily located.
4. Commerce Clearing House, Pensions and Profit-Sharing.
The Commerce Clearing House periodically revises this 
publication, which is an excellent source for anyone 
interested in plan draftsmanship. It consists of 
specimen clauses selected from several hundred plans.
The plan from which each clause is drawn is not identi­
fied, however.
CHAPTER II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS -IN- THE UNITED STATES
Development Prior to World War II
Before delving into the historical development of private pension
plans, it might be revealing to examine the meaning and some of the
connotations of the term "pension." The word itself derives from an
identical Latin word meaning "payment." As currently used, a pension
is understood to mean a regular or periodic payment to a beneficiary
who has not directly contributed to the cost of its provision. The
term "annuity" is used to designate a recurring payment, the right to
which was purchased by the beneficiary. The term pension, therefore,
connotes a gratuity passing from one party to another, while annuity
conveys the idea of a purchased or earned right. The difference is
crucial. A gift might be withdrawn at any time, at the discretion of
1
the giver, while an annuity, being an acquired right, cannot.
The early legal status of privately provided retirement systems 
tended to place them well within the meaning ascribed to the term 
pension in the above discussion. Further examination of this problem 
will be reserved for later treatment.
Pre-dating the inauguration of pension plans were certain 
employer practices which eventually led to the development of form­
alized pension systems. One such practice was to assign aged
‘'"Murray W. Latimer, Industrial Pens ion Systems (New York:
Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932) p. 9-10. For a somewhat 
contrary view, see Arthur David Cloud, Pensions in Modern Industry, 
(Chicago: Hawkins and Loomis Co., 1930), p. 251.
5
6employees to duties requiring little physical or mental application,
e.g., gatekeeper or watchman. The number of such jobs available are
obviously limited, however, and a number of firms appear to have slowly
evolved highly informal systems for providing retirement income to long
service employees. Where they existed, these schemes were not generally
announced to employees. A superannuated employee was simply released
from service and informed that he had been granted a pension "for long
and faithful service." Whenever a formal statement concerning such a
plan was issued, the firm often hedged by stating that it would grant
pensions to the "deserving," Such a system really amounted to
paternalistic charity, and was not a true pension system at all. It
could be Successfully argued that a pens ion system exists only where
benefits are available to any employee who satisfies a set of stated,
2
standardized requirements, without discrimination.
Under such a definition, the first pension plan in manufacturing
3
was inaugurated by Alfred Dolge, a felt manufacturer, in 1882. This
4
plan was preceeded by plans in the railroad and a closely related in­
dustry,^ but it must be counted as the first manufacturing or industrial 
pension plan. By present standards, it was a most ambitious undertaking.
^Ibid., p. 10.
3
Ibid.. p. 39, and Rainard B. Robbins, Pension Planning in the 
United States, Mineographed, 1952, p. 3.
^See United States Department of Labor, Fifth Annual Report of the 
Commission of Labor, 1889, p. 28, for description of a plan established 
by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1874.
"’The American Express Company (now the Railway Express Agency) 
introduced a plan in 1875. See M. Riebeneck, Railway Provident 
Institutions in English Speaking Countries (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania
Railroad Co|, 1905), p. 182. Cited in Latimer, 0£. cit., p. 38.
7After ten years service, an employee could retire with a yearly benefit
equal to one-half of what his wage had been during the final year of
employment. After twenty-five years service, he could claim full pay.
Other benefits included a profit sharing plan, a life insurance plan,
and an endowment fund plan. These plans were highly publicized by
Dolge,’apparently recommending their adoption by other firms. The
record of appeal in the case of Dolge vs. Dolge cited two publications
dealing with the plans.
After an employee had achieved five years of service, he was
given a passbook by Dolge into which was annually entered a record
of benefits to which he had become entitled or amounts which had
been credited to his account for payment of future benefits. What
the passbook seemed to give with the one hand was quite efficiently
taken away by the other, however. Witness the following statement
7which appeared therein:
It is distinctly understood that all and every of the 
provisions of this law are voluntary on behalf of said
house of Alfred Dolge, and that this law does not, nor
does any of the provisions herein contained, confer any 
legal right or create any legal right in favor or any 
employee of said house mentioned herein, or of any 
person or persons whomsoever, nor any legal liability 
on behalf of said house of Alfred Dolge, or of said 
Alfred Dolge, either in law or in equity.
C.
Alfred Dolge, The Just Distribution of Earnings, So-Called 
"Profit Sharing" (New York: Paris Exposition, 1889), p. 93 and
Practical Application of Economic Theories in the Factories of 
Alfred Dolge and Son (New York: Dolgeville Herald Publishing
Company, 1896), p. 244.
^Dolge vs. Dolge, 70 App. Div. 517, 518, quoted in Latimer, 
op. cit., p. 686.
There is no record of any funds ever having been set aside by the
house of Dolge to meet obligations seemingly created by the plan. The
Dolge firm failed in 1898, precipitating a suit by former employees who
sought to recover benefits believed to have accrued to them. The court
relying on .the passbook language quoted above, ruled that the plan did
not constitute a binding agreement between Dolge and his employees.
"It was simply a benevolent plan proposed by him, and it was solely
8
within his power to carry it out or not."
Another plan, quite similar to that of Dolge, was established by
the Solvay Process Company in 1892, with similar results. Although it
was established later than the Dolge plan, a case at law reached the
courts under the Solvay plan first. The announced purpose of the plan
was to provide "a means of support by reason of accident, sickness or
9
advanced age labor must cease." The plan was noncontributory, sup­
ported wholly by the firm. The passbook method of record keeping was 
employed and each employee's share in the fund was entered periodically 
The company declared the monies so set aside to be gifts, and the 
company's trustees were authorized to rule on all questions of any 
employee's right to collect.
An employee who was discharged in 1895 entered suit to recover the 
amount credited to his passbook, claiming this to be his share of the
pension fund. The case reached the New York Supreme Court which.
10
ruled, in part, as follows:
8Ibid., p. 520-521.
Q
Latimer, o£. cit., p. 682.
^ McNevin vs. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 612-613.
9Under the regulations established it seems to me that none 
of the employees has a vested right in any part of this fund, 
even though credited upon their passbooks, until the gift is 
completed by actual payment. Until that time, it is an inchoate 
gift. The articles provide that an employee cannot in any 
case demand payment of the sum credited to his account except 
when the defendant shall adjudge the account to be payable in 
whole or in part, according to the rules and regulations 
established, and it is also provided that the sums credited 
shall remain the property of the defendant until actually 
paid, and that the fund shall be and remain under the sole 
control of the defendant's trustees, who are authorized to 
decide all questions concerning it without appeal.
Posting of credits to an employee's passbook was quickly abandoned
as a method of accounting for accrued pension "rights." The passbook
seems to have been much too close to an admission of liability for the
amounts credited therein. The holder of such a passbook naturally
assumed that he had a vested right to the extent of his credits. While
this might have been good for employee morale, it was very bad legal
practice. It is not surprising therefore that the use of passbooks
was quietly and quickly discontinued.
The Solvay Plan was discontinued in the same year, 1895, that the
above mentioned case was adjudicated. According to one writer, the
President of Solvay "believes that the class of workmen employed at
11
Solvay are not yet ready to appreciate a scheme of this character.
The oldest plan of continuous operation was established by the 
Carnegie Steel Company in 1901. Operated at first on an informal basis, 
the system was formalized in 1911 when Carnegie merged with the United 
States Steel Company. The method of computing an individual's annual 
pension was surprisingly similar to present practices. The amount
11
Nicholas Paine Gilman, A Dividend to Labor (New York: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899), p. 287.
10
payable annually was equal to 1 percent of the average annual salary
during the whole period of employment times years of service. Thus, a
20-year man who had averaged $2,400 in wages per year was eligible for
a $480 annual benefit. Normal retirement age was 60 years, with a mini-
12
mum of 15 years service. The plan was revised in 1911, raising the
service requirement to 20 years, with compulsory retirement at age 70.
In addition, the benefit was computed by taking 1 percent of the
average pay during the last ten years of employment. A minimum pension
13
of $144 and a maximum of $1,200 was established.
Effective January 1, 1903, the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey established an informal plan which was to become the basis
of several separate plans upon the dissolution of the firm in a 1911
antitrust suit. All retirements upder the original system were
solely at the discretion of the Board of Directors. Some of the rules
under which the plan operated were somewhat eccentric, especially one
which allowed a 20-year employee between ages 60 and 65 to retire with
an annuity equal to 50 percent of his average pay, while an employee
with 25 years service could retire at age 65 with a pension of only 25
percent of average pay. In any event, a man who retired before 65 got
his allowance cut in half upon reaching that age. It would appear
that the firm wished to encourage retirement at earlier ages, at least
14
in those cases approved by the board.
12
Latimer, op. cit., p. 40. 
13Ibid. , p. 1005 
14Ibid., p. 1010
11
A 1929 survey conducted by the non-profit Industrial Relations 
Counselors, Inc. showed that an additional 14 manufacturers had joined 
the rank of those with plans by 1910.^  Age and service requirements 
of most of these plans had eligibility requirements which closely re­
sembled those of the plans discussed above. Several, such as the 
du Pont plan, required that the employee be incapacitated. Others 
allowed early retirement where incapacity was present after a minimum 
service requirement of from 5 to 15 years. A few provided that pay­
ments, at the discretion of the firm, could be continued to the 
dependents of a deceased pensioner.
It is apparent from examining these early schemes that many 
present pension plans use essentially the same methods of establish­
ing eligibility and computing the amount of benefit to be received.
The most outstanding changes have been connected with funding of the 
plans, the Achilles heel of many early plans, and with vesting pro­
visions. Too, collective bargaining has formalized present plans, 
with much less discretion in the hands of management.
•^These firms are listed below in order of the date of pension 
plan adoption.
1. Talbot Mills (textiles) 1903
2. Gerham Manufacturing Co. (silverware) 1903
3. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. 1904
4. National Machinery Co. 1905
5. Western Electric Co. 1906
6. Deere and Co. (farm machinery) 1908
7. International Harvester 1908
8. Murphy Varnish Co. 1908
9. Tidewater Oil Co. 1908
10. Westinghouse Air Brake 1908
11. Simonds Saw and Steel Co. 1908
12. American Stove Company 1910
13. Parke Davis and Co. (pharmaceutical) 1910
14. Wurlitzer Manufacturing Co. 1910
12
From the faltering start discussed above, the pension movement 
gradually spread to other American firms. As was the case originally, 
most of the firms involved were quite large. By 1929, 139 manufacturers 
reported plans covering 1,227,494 employees. The iron and steel in­
dustry led the way, with 24 separate plans covering 390,854 workers.
The petroleum industry reported 15 firms with plans covering 192,645
employees. Conspicuously absent was the burgeoning automobile
16
industry, which reported not a single plan.
The above figures tend to grossly overstate the extent to which 
employees in American manufacturing were "covered," on the eve of the 
great depression. It should be pointed out that only a minute portion 
of the employees affected had a right to a pension payment even if all 
of a plan's prerequisites were net. Furthermore, even after pension 
payments commenced there was no guarantee that they would not be re­
duced or withdrawn altogether. Finally, labor mobility studies 
indicate that a surprisingly small percentage of these "covered" would 
actually fulfill the age and service requirements. In one recent study,
a firm which employed 776 workers in 1940 had retained only 17 percent
17of these until 1956. In 1963, a Census Bureau sampling showed
18
average job tenure for men to be only 5.7 years.
16Latimer, op. cit., p. 991.
17U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Analytical 
Note No. 113 (1960) p. 2, Table 1.
1 Q
U. S. Department of Labor, Job Tenure of American Workers, 
January, 1963, Special Labor Force Report (1963).
13
Present practices do not alleviate the problem of becoming
covered which springs from this last mentioned pitfall. The more or
less contractual nature of present plans does, however, go much
further in insuring that pension payments will be made to those
employees who satisfy eligibility requirements. Presently, 70 percent
of the covered workers in manufacturing are included in plans mentioned
19
in collective bargaining agreements.
The pension plan movement continued to spread in spite of the
Depression of the 1930s. A 1938 study showed 238 plans operating in
20
manufacturing alone. The U. S. Department of Labor estimates that
21
in 1940 some 437 manufacturers had plans covering 2,819,000 workers.
How was it that, even in the face of adverse economic conditions, the
pension movement continued to spread? One answer might be the in-.
creasing strength of trade unions, particularly in the industrial
sector of the economy. This does not, however, appear to be the case.
One authority, writing in 1932, stated that little if any of the
impetus came from workers. "Rarely, if ever, as the record shows,
has the inauguration of a pension plan came about as the result of
22
demands from the employees." There is, in fact, no evidence that 
organized labor took an interest in bargaining for pensions until after
19U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 
No. 1407, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans, U. S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., p. 7. ’
^Charles L. Dearing, Industrial Pensions, Washington, D. C.: 
(Brookings Institute, 1954), p. 47.
^B.L.S. Bulletin No. 1407, p. 52.
22 Latimer, ojd. cit., p. 19.
14
World War II. The answer must lie elsewhere. Primarily, the movement
seems to have expanded because of: (a) the changing status of the
American worker, and (b) increasing recognition by employers that,
for one reason or another, providing pensions to aged employees is a
23
sound business practice.
A. The Changing Status of the American Worker
(1) Passage of the frontier and free lands.
Many writers, including historians, sociologists, and economists, believe 
that the frontier and its abundant free acreage provided a safety 
valve for the urbanized, industrialized East. The frontier undoubtedly 
gave the worker the feeling that he had "somewhere to go" should 
employment become unavailable in the nation's mills and factories. In 
the case of the aged worker, the escape valve may have been more 
psychological than real, but it probably did add a feeling of security 
in the future which would otherwise have been missing.
(2) The rise of industrial organization and the passage of 
agriculture and handicraft manufacturing as the primary 
employments.
Generally, the farmer and the blacksmith found it possible to eke out 
a subsistence level of existence in spite of the ravages of old age.
The employee of a large industrial firm must labor full time and 
efficiently or not at all.
2 3For discussion of these factors, see: Charles L. Dearing, 
op. cit., p. 30-40; Arthur D. Cloud, oj3. cit.. p. 158-172, and 
Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Chapters I and II.
15
(3) Increasingly complex domestic arrangements stemming from the 
breakdown of the family as the economic unit.
Whereas the family farm operated as an economic unit and provided
security for its aged members, city grandparents commonly live apart
from their adult offspring whose cash income is often stretched to the
limit in providing for their own needs.
(4) The increasing number of employees who reach retirement age. 
Many factors have combined to give the modern worker a longer life 
expectancy. Among these are better medical treatment, better diet, 
safer and more healthful working conditions, and a shorter working 
day, week, and year.
B . Changing Employer Attitudes
(1) Adoption of the corporate form of organization.
An individual proprietorship and a partnership's life is concurrent 
with that of the owner(s). Pension planning is necessarily a matter 
of long-run plannings and the corporation, with its unlimited life, 
can establish a viable plan much more readily than can an organization 
with an uncertain life expectancy.
(2) Discovery that the maintenance of the aged and infirm as 
regular employees can be costly.
Retention of the superannuated worker can be an expensive operation,
particularly for such pursuits as railroading and heavy industry,
where a single accident might cost thousands or even millions of
dollars. Additionally, for employers who pay equal wages to all - a
common practice in industry - many probably found themselves paying
a wage which exceeded the value of marginal product of the aged worker.
16
If the disparity was great enough, pensioning the aged employee in­
creased profits.
(3) During periods of labor shortages, pension systems aid the 
firm in attracting and holding a competent work force.
As will be discussed later, many firms during World War II offered
liberal fringe benefits, including pensions, as a means of securing
badly needed workers.
(4) Pensions encourage long, uninterrupted service.
Most pensions require lengthy service as a condition of eligibility.
A firm might therefore be able to retain valuable, experienced personnel 
if the inducement of pension rights is present. Also, while present 
strike settlements provide that strikes will not be considered an 
interruption in service, such was not the case formerly. In an 
earlier time, the existence of a pension plan not only discouraged 
union membership, which enhanced the possibility of a strike, but 
also counseled against striking after a union had been formed.
Either way, the employer stood to benefit.
(5) Reputation of the firm.
Business firms discovered long ago that it is good policy to maintain 
a good public image. As present writers are fond of pointing out, the 
large corporation has many publics, including stockholders, customers, 
government, and employees. jThe "humane" nature of pension planning 
appeals to various degrees to all of these.
(6) Altruism.
No capitalist outside the covers of Karl Marx is so callous as not to 
feel some pangs of conscience upon releasing an aged long service
17
employee without providing him with some means of support.
(7) Taxes.
The Department of Internal Revenue allows an employer to deduct pension 
plan contributions from taxable income. With the drastic increase in 
tax rates during the early 1940s, providing for a given pension pay­
ment began to cost much less in terms of after tax profits.
For these reasons, it appears that pension plan coverage would 
have expanded without the considerable upheaval experienced by the 
nation during and after World War II, Nevertheless, events following 
1940 drastically changed the extent and nature of pension planning.
The National War Labor Board and the Advance of Fringe Benefits 
During World War II
On the eve of America's entry into World War II, it was apparent 
that some type of public body would be necessary to insure peaceful 
industrial relations in the nation's defense connected industries in 
the event the nation became an active participant in the hostilities; 
an occurrence which seemed inevitable by 1941. The first such public 
body was the National Defense Mediation Board, created on March 19, 
1941. Fortunately, America's involvement in the war came gradually, 
because the powers of the NDMB soon proved inadequate to its task of 
maintaining industrial peace. For all practical purposes, the Board 
was active for eight months, during which time it developed tech­
niques and procedures which were to prove invaluable when the nation 
became directly engaged in the world-wide struggle.
The demise of the NDMB came as a result of a dispute between the 
United Mine Workers and several steel manufacturers concerning the
18
adoption of a union shop arrangement in the so-called "captive mines," 
a group of coal mines owned directly by the steel firms. The firms 
were afraid that acquiescense in the coal mines would result in re­
newed efforts on the part of the United Steelworkers, a CIO union, to 
secure the union shop in the steel mills themselves; a demand which 
they had been successful in opposing. Increasing bitterness among 
members of the tripartite NDMB over the issue led to the resignation 
of the CIO members in November of 1941, robbing the Board of its power 
of persuasion, the only weapon with which it could secure compliance.
With the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, it was 
imperative that some method be found by which costly work stoppages 
could be prevented. When the National War Labor Board was formed on 
January 12, 1942, its primary function was therefore to prevent
24
strikes in war industries by mediation and adjudication of disputes. 
The Board was concerned with wage issues only if they were the basis 
of a dispute which came before it. At first, no attempt was made by 
the Board to control wage rates generally. During the first several 
months of its existence, "the Board acted on the assumption that 
employers would be reluctant to grant wage increases, and that, 
therefore, they could be expected not to agree in collective bargain­
ing negotiations to greater wage increases than the Board would grant
25
had the matter come before it as a dispute case."
^ J .  C. Record, "The War Labor Board: an Experiment in Wage 
Stabilization," American Economic Review, Vol. 34, Sept. 1944, p. 99.
25U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 
No. 1009, Problems and Policies of Dispute Settlement and Wage 
Stabilization During World War II, 1950, p. 63.
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With full-scale mobilization underway, however, pressing manpower
shortages resulted, and employers throughout the nation readily granted
sizeable wage increases in the hope of attracting the necessary work
force. As it was apparent that the nation would experience a chronic
shortage of manpower for the duration of the conflict, the Board's
original policy promised to be highly inflationary. In early 1942,
in the General Cable Case, the Board formally recognized that "it
would be impossible to stabilize wage rates if limitation on wage in-
26
creases were “applied only to the dispute cases that came to it."
Developing technique and precedent as it went, the Board in
July, 1942, established wage guidelines in the so-called "Little
Steel Formula," a standard to which it adhered more or less stead-
27
fastly for the duration. Basically, the formula was intended to
permit to employees an increase in wage rates equal to the rise in
the cost of living between January, 1941 and May, 1942. An increase
of this amount was granted to workers in "Little Steel" and it was
the intention of the Board to allow employees in "laggard" plants an
28equal percentage increase.
The formula worked with a minimum of friction until early 1944. 
Difficulty arose as the cost of living continued to rise, while the 
Little Steel Formula remained unchanged. Both wage earners and union 
leaders felt they were suffering under an unjust formula. Employers,
26Ibid., p. 64.
27Ibid. ,, p., 156. 
28Ibid., p. 157
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reversing their usual role, constantly pressed the Board for wage in­
creases in the hope that such advances would enable them to attract and
hold larger and more competent work forces . "The unchanged formula
29became a symbol of grievance which grew in irritation."
Unwilling to depart from Little Steel for fear that once the 
guideline had been breached there would be no stopping the tides of 
inflation, the Board for a while stoically withstood the growing pres­
sure being placed on it by management and labor alike. One public
member of the Board admitted frankly that during this period the
30Board operated in a "strangely murky atmosphere."
Operating pragmatically as it had from the start, the Board soon 
found what they considered a relatively inflation-free escape valve.
The idea was to allow rather liberal (for then) advances in fringe 
benefits, such as vacations, shift differentials, severance pay, and 
pensions, while holding the line on wages. By doing so, the Board
felt that it "relieved somewhat the always tremendous pressure to in-
, . _ ,,31
crease basic wage rates."
Relying heavily as it did on voluntarism to secure compliance with
its directives, it was imperative that the Board retain the support of
of both labor and management. Hence, "considerable flexibility" was
required if the support of these groups was to be maintained in
29Ibid.
30Dexter M. Keezer, "Observations on the Operations of the 
NWLB," American Economic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, June, 1946, p. 240.
31
Ibid., p. 256 . .o
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"accepting and applying the Government principle of wage stabilize^
tion."32 The result of the Board's "considerable flexibility" was that
although basic wage rates were reasonably well stabilized, labor costs
advanced rather rapidly because of failure to hold the line on fringe
issues. According to the Board, "this moderate weakening of the
stabilization line had the more than compensating virtue of permitting
a realistic adjustment of labor standards to the practical problems
of peaceful and cooperative industrial relations. ° Of all the
issues which came before it, "...fringe issues were the most flexibly 
34treated."
The explosive spread of fringe benefits created new problems.
Although they did not unduly aggravate the economy's inflationary
tendency by directly increasing demand for the limited output of
civilian goods, they did increase the cost of production, making the
price stabilization program of the Office of Price Administration
much more difficult to administer. Consequently, the Board soon
found it necessary to establish standards or guidelines for fringe
benefits. The announcement of such limits had an unforeseen result.
As in the case of any stabilizing limit, these fringe stan­
dards came to create in the minds of labor leaders and 
workers the notion that they were entitled to such benefits 
as a matter of right. It became increasingly difficult to 
deny such increases to any group of employees.




By the time hostilities ceased and demobilization had begun, a 
very sizeable number of the nation's blue collar workers found them­
selves enjoying perquisites which had formerly been reserved for in­
dustry's upper echelons. The degree of effort which unions currently 
devote to fringe issues indicates that the nation's employees often 
prefer these benefits over higher basic wages. A trend started under 
the exigencies of war is obviously here to stay. Certainly, workers 
have come to consider such benefits as perfectly legitimate demands on 
indus try.
Although industrial pension planning had a history covering more 
than half a century, organized labor, for the most part, remained in­
different to the experiment until the mid-1940s. Indeed, it appears 
that some of the nation's unions had "actually opposed employer 
sponsored plans, viewing them as paternalistic devices designed to
36wean the allegiance of the workers from the unions to management."
At most, until the close of the War, unions had more or less accepted 
pensions as falling wholly within the discretion of management to give 
or withhold. Whatever the cause, pensions had not become the subject 
of collective bargaining except where management had occasionally in­
vited organized labor to participate in preparing or revising a plan. 
It was left to the United Mine Workers under John L. Lewis to force­
fully draw labor's attention to pensions.
"^Dearing, op. cit., p. 41.
23
The United Mine Workers and a_ Union Sponsored Plan
A new philosophy began to envelope the nation's labor movement 
following the war. Whereas unions, particularly industrial unions, had 
formerly been interested in securing immediately realizable gains such 
as wage boosts and greater union security, attention now began to 
focus more strongly on long-range benefits such as pensions. The new 
position of labor was succinctly stated by John L. Lewis of the Mine 
Workers in 1948. According to Lewis, a coal company would be prohib­
ited from using a mule to a point where it became incapacitated:
...and then turning it out on the street to die; and yet 
that is what the bituminous industry has been doing with 
its man power.
We hold that the proper care of the human element in the 
mining industry should properly be charged to the cost 
of production and not assessed against the taxpayers as 
a whole. The industry should do it, and the commodity 
should bear the cost of it - whatever that may be. This 
is a chance for labor and management to take care of 
these problems and eliminate the necessity for government 
to build up huge, inefficient and costly administrative 
bureaus to try to do the task in a less efficient way.
This was the philosophy which led Lewis to demand an industry
sponsored retirement fund for coal miners in contract negotiations of
early 1946. The original demand was for a 7 percent payroll assessment,
38
the fund thus created to be administered by the union. The Mine 
Operators Negotiating Committee balked at the union's demands, and the 
President ordered the mines seized on May 21, 1946, under provisions of
37U. J3. News and World Report, "Pensions: The Coming Issue in 
Labor Relations. An Interview with John L. Lewis," Nov. 19, 1948, 
p . 35.
38U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 63, 
No. 2, August, 1946, p. 171.
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the War Labor Disputes Act. On May 29, 1946, Secretary of the Interior
Julius A. Krug, acting as Coal Mines Administrator, signed an agreement
with the Mine Workers which, among other things, provided for a
"welfare and retirement fund financed by 5 cents a ton on coal produced 
39for use or sale." By 1948, the contribution had risen to 20 cents a
40ton, and in 1950 was set at 30 cents a ton.
The Krug-Lewis agreement became the springboard from which other 
unions later launched their retirement system demands. For almost 
three years after this agreement was reached, however, neither labor 
nor management could say with certainty whether pensions were a 
legitimate subject for collective bargaining. The issue was finally 
resolved in a case arising out of a dispute between the United 
Steelworkers of America and Inland Steel Company.
The Inland Steel Case: Pensions Become a Bargainable Issue
Since passage of the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) in 
1935, it has been the policy of the federal government to encourage the 
use of collective bargaining as a means of settling labor-management 
disputes. The act states that employees shall have the right to organ­
ize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing for the purpose of "negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment...," Further, the act made it an unfair labor practice 
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively over these matters
39
Ibid., p. 172.
40U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 74,
No. 1, January, 1952, p. 37.
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with a certified bargaining agent. While this general obligation had 
rested on management since 1935, the specific issue of pensions as a 
bargainable issue was not presented to the National Labor Relations 
Board until 1947.
In 1936, the Inland Steel Company had unilaterally installed a re­
tirement plan, and had amended it several times thereafter. The 
Steelworkers Union charged that Inland, by unilaterally amending the 
pension program, and by refusing to discuss the matter at the bargain­
ing table, had changed the employees "wages" and "conditions of :
employment" and was thus violating Section 8(a) of the Wagner Act
% 41
(refusal to bargain).
As this was the way the issue was presented to the NLRB in late 
1947, it was the duty of the Board to decide whether a retirement plan 
could be rightfully considered either "wages" or a "condition of 
employment." Inland sought to show that pension plans fell outside 
the acceptable interpretation of both these terms. It further argued 
that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that pensions lay out­
side the range of bargainable issues since their negotiation at the
bargaining table was not a "general practice of collective bar- 
42
gaining."
The board dealt first with the issue of whether pensions could 
properly be considered as "wages" under the Act. Emphatically stating 
that they should be so considered, the Board found that an employer's
^ I n  the Matter of Inland Steel Co. and Local Unions No. 1010 
and 65, United Steel Workers of America (CIO), 77 NLRB No. 1, p . 1.
^ Ibid., p. 5.
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monetary contribution to a pension plan constituted an economic enhance­
ment of the employee's money wages.
Realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or 
increase, no less than any other, becomes an integral part 
of the entire wage structure, and the character of the 
employee representative's interest in it, and the terms 
of its grant, is no different than in any other ease where 
a change in the wage structure is effected. Indeed, the 
practice of offering retirement benefits in lieu of current 
wage increases is not uncommon in bargaining between 
employers and employee's representatives.^3
The Board went on to note that the Treasury Department had taxed 
pension income as wages since 1918, and that the courts had ruled 
that pension benefits constituted."wages" in.a bankruptcy case,44 
On the question of whether pensions were bargainable on the 
grounds that they were a "condition of employment," Inland argued 
that the term should be interpreted to mean "working conditions," and 
therefore should only be used to refer to the physical conditions 
under which an employee is required to work, not to the terms or con­
ditions upon which employment is. afforded.
The Board, observing that viewing pensions as wages was sufficient 
to establish a bargainable issue, only briefly considered the merits
of this argument, although it did strongly imply that pensions were a
45
"condition of employment."
43Ibid., p. 5. The same view had been stated much earlier by 
a professional economist: See Albert deRoods, "Pensions as Wages," 




Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, that body, in upholding the Board,
indicated that it thought the Board would have been on sounder ground
had it ruled pensions bargainable on the basis of "other conditions of
46
employment" rather than on the basis of their being wages. In a
later (1953) case, the Court explicitly stated that pensions should be
47considered as a "condition of employment."
Turning to Inland's contention that pensions lay outside the
"general practice of collective bargaining" and because of this was
not a bargainable issue, the Board saw the matter quite differently.
It stated that disputes over pensions should be subject to collective
bargaining "irrespective of the fact that the specific difference to
be adjusted has not previously been regularly considered in the
48framing of collective bargaining."
After the NLRB's ruling that pensions were a bargainable issue was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1949, the Board subsequently ruled that
several other similar benefits were bargainable, such as hospitalization,
49 50sick benefits, group insurance, stock bonuses, stock purchase plans,
51and thrift plans.
46Inland Steel Co. vs. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247, 251 (1949) certiorari 
denied by the Supreme Court, but accepted on another point, 336 US 960 
(1949) .
47plsen vs. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 200 F. 2d 700.
4^In the Matter of Inland Steel, 77 NLRB No. 1, p. 9.
4977 NLRB No. 1162.
5096 NLRB No. 1309.
5l110 NLRB No. 356.
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With the legal nature of:pensions as a bargainable issue firmly
established, unions lost little time opening the subject in contract
negotiations. The phenomenal rate of growth of such plans is a gauge
of their success in securing pensions benefits and of management's
52
willingness to grant them. ,
The Extent of Fens ion .Plan Coverage at the Present Time
The rate of installation of new pension plans in the last two
decades has been quite rapid. In the fall of 1960, the U. S.
Department of Labor received reports on over 16,000 private pension 
plans covering 15.6 million workers. The average plan coverage was 
approximately 1,000 workers. Only 2 percent of these plans were estab­
lished in the first four decades of this century. Approximately two-
53
thirds were established after 1949, More than 60 percent of all
54plans and covered workers were in manufacturing. As of July, 1963, 
the Department of Labor reported that it had on file some 32,610 
retirement plan reports. Only about 22,000 of these were pension 
plans; the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that about 30 percent 
of all plans reporting are profit sharing, stock bonus, and savings 
plans, and therefore not pension plans per se. On the basis of the 
previously noted average coverage, some 20 to 22 million workers are
52 In 1949, the Steel Industry Board strongly recommended the 
establishment of private pension plans. See: Steel Industry Board, 
Report to: the President of the United States on the Labor Dispute 
in the Basic Steel Industry. Sept. 10, 1949,
5 0
U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor Mobility and Private 




covered by pension systems. Approximately one-half of these are in man­
ufacturing.^ For the same month of 1963, the civilian labor force was.
56
75.1 million, of whom 17.1 million were in manufacturing. From these 
data, it would appear that less than 30 percent of all labor force 
participants are covered, but that approximately two-thirds of the 
nation's manufacturing employees are covered. A 1959 prediction by 
Robert Tilove that by 1969 "approximately 45 to 55 percent of the wage 
and salary force - outside agriculture and government - will be covered 
by private pension plans... appears overly optimistic in view of 
recent data.
Despite the rapid rate of installment of new plans in the last two 
decades, the overall picture of pension plan coverage is still rather 
spotty. As the above figures indicate, coverage is concentrated in 
manufacturing. Even.here, there are thousands of small firms employ­
ing millions of workers who are not covered. At the other extreme is 
such pursuits as retailing, services, and agriculture, in which a 
very small minority of all employees are covered.
While there are many elements which undoubtedly influence the 
spread of pension plan coverage, three factors stand out. These are:
(a) firm size; (b) labor force turnover rate of an industry, and; (c) 
the existence or absence of a trade union. These will be discussed 
in turn.
-^U. S. Department of Labor, Fifty Second Annual Report, 1964, 
p. 103.
56U. S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 86,
No. 10, p. 1220.
57'Robert Tilove, Pension Funds and Economic Freedom, (New York;
The Fund for the Republic* 1959), p. 9.
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In a day when we are constantly being bombarded with books and
articles warning of the dangers of bigness, it comes as a surprise to
find that at latest count there were 3,362,835 firms operating in the
United States. For the most part, they are small. Some 3,000,000 of
them employ less than 20 workers; 3,240,000 of them less than 50.
58
Fewer than 60,000 employ 100 or more. As previously noted, only
about 20,000 of these firms have pension plans, and, on the average,
each plan covers about 1,000 workers. Obviously, a large majority of
the nation's small employers have no plan at all. While a growing
59number of new plans being installed are by smaller firms, many labor
experts doubt that more than fifty percent coverage can ever be 
60
achieved.
Another problem which faces a large number of the nation's workers 
is connected with meeting pension plan service requirements. In em­
ployments where the labor turnover rate is high, this problem is 
especially acute. Indeed, in the construction industry pension plans 
are almost non-existent because of this problem. The only solution
appears to be the establishment of multi-employer plans with portable
credits. The thorny problems connected with such a system are manifold, 
however. One authority believes the solution lies either in vesting of 
credits or in the establishment of a central clearing house device to
s. Department of Commerce, 1965 Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 86th ed., p. 496.
■^BLS Bulletin 1407, p. 6.
^Clark Kerr, "Social and Economic Consequences of the Pension 
Drive," Handbook on Pensions (New York: National Industrial Conference 
Board, 1950) , p. 84.
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61facilitate transfer of credits from one employer to another. Until 
some such system is developed, workers in rapid turnover industries 
will have to rely on Social Security benefits, however inadequate these 
may be.
While it is not here suggested that the remedy to the problem of
inadequate coverage is to be found in expansion of trade unionism, the
fact remains that approximately 70 percent of all plans now operating
62
are contained in collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, the 
rapid spread of coverage since 1949 strongly suggests that the expansion 
occurred as a result of pensions becoming a bargainable issue.
Table II-l catalogues this expansion.
Table II-l. Distribution of Private Pension Plans by Date of 
Establishment (all Industries).
















Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 1407
Bernstein, oj5. cit., p. 264.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1407, p. 7.
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While bargained pension plans are approaching saturation in many
industries - in 1960, 90 percent of the members of the Steelworkers
63Union were covered -.. in. traditionally non-union Indus tries...and
regions.,, coverage is not nearly so extensive.
Whatever the factors which encourage or discourage the spread of 
pension systems, the above discussion suggests that much remains to be 
done if the mass of this nation's employees are to enjoy the benefits 
of private pensions in their final years. As indicated by Table II-l, 
the rate of introduction of new plans is rather high, but it also in­
dicates that the average coverage per plan is falling rapidly. This 
is somewhat encouraging in itself, however, since it is among small 
employers that coverage is least prevalent. It will also be noted 
from Table II-l that pension plan installations exhibit a cyclical 
sensitivity. During or immediately following the post-war recessions 
of 1947-48, 1957-58, and 1960, the number of plans established show a 
marked decline. Perhaps the sustained prosperity of the 1960s will 
result in a more rapid spread of pension coverage. Recent statistics 
strongly indicate that such a trend might be under way.
6 3Bernstein, o£. cit., p. 183-184.
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v CHAPTER III 
NORMAL PLAN PROVISIONS
Introduction
Of necessity, every pension plan contains a series of provisions 
dealing with such matters as administration of the plan, eligibility 
requirements, benefit formulae, and financing arrangements. Obviously, 
therefore, pension plans differ insofar as their provisions treat these 
matters differently. This Chapter is devoted to an examination of the 
variety of plan provisions which are common to present pension systems. 
Such an examination serves several purposes: the terminology of pension 
systems is developed; a basis for comparing pension plans is provided; 
detection of developing trends in plan provisions is made possible, 
and; the types of provisions which are widely used as well as S:CMa%': 
relatively fare provisions may be .pointed out.
The order in which pension plan provisions are examined in this 
work has no particular significance except that of lending clarity to 
the exposition. Treatment of these matters in actual plans may occur 
in quite different order, as, indeed they do.
Finally, this examination makes no pretense of being a comprehen­
sive examination of all extant plan provisions . It is the belief of 
the author, however, that all of the more frequently used industrial 
pension plan provisions are to be found here.
Administration of the Plan
Broadly speaking, there are three administrative functions con­
nected with the operation of a plan. These functions involve (1) record
34
keeping, (2) ruling on the validity of benefit claims, and (3) financial 
administration.
A routine function of plan administration is the maintenance of
basic records necessary to establish eligibility and benefit rights
under the plan. These records contain such information as the age, sex,
earnings, and date of employment of each plan participant. Basically
a clerical chore, little administrative supervision is needed once the
system is established. As a practical matter, record keeping is
usually delegated to the firms' personnel departments whose files al-
1
ready contain most of the records needed.
A more important function of plan administration is the processing 
of behefit claims as they are presented by participating employees.
When such a claim is presented, the administrative agency must (1) 
verify that the applicant has reached retirement age, (2) determine 
the applicant's eligibility insofar as service requirements are con­
cerned, and (3) compute the amount of benefit to which he is entitled.
Finally, under many plans, safe and profitable investment of accum­
ulated pension funds is the. responsibility of the plan's administrative 
body. In the past, this duty has been avoided by many of the smaller 
plans by either relinquishing control of pension funds to banks who act 
as trustees of the fund, or by the purchase of annuities from insurance 
companies. At present, almost all of the larger plans and many of the 
smaller ones retain control of financial management of funds accumulated
Jay V. Strong, Employee Benefit Flans in Operation, (Washington, 
D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1951), p. 117.
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under the plan. In such a case, it is the duty of the administrative 
agency to manage what may be a rather large investment portfolio.
A. Administration by Management
Industrial pension plan administration has gone through two phases 
and.appears to be entering a third. In the first phase, administration 
of plans tended to be exclusively exercised by management. This was 
before the development of negotiated pension plans, which generally 
date from 1949. With few exceptions, plan administration was under the 
control of the sponsoring firm before this time. Most larger firms 
appointed a "pension board" or "pension committee" to supervise plan 
operations. The members of these supervisory bodies were answerable 
directly to the firm and served at the firm's discretion. Unions 
generally assumed that they had no right to participate in these 
matters,^
B . Joint Adminis tration
As a consequence of pensions becoming a bargainable issue in the 
late 1940s, many unions have obtained contractual rights to participate 
in plan management. As pension administration moved into this phase, 
union members gained the right to sit on joint administrative boards 
composed of equal numbers of company and union representatives. The 
power of such administrative bodies was limited however to determina­
tion of an applicant's eligibility and pension.amount. Management of
2Charles L. Dearing, Indus tr ia1 Pens ions, (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1954), p. 81.
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funds created under the plan remained under the exclusive control of 
3
management.
By and large, this is the way in which most industrial pension 
plans are now administered. The chief function of the union in such a 
restricted administrative capacity is to insure that a pension will be 
forthcoming to a worker who has established eligibility, and to make 
certain that the amount of the benefit is correct.
The third phase into which industrial pension plan administration 
appears to be entering concerns union participation in the handling of 
trust funds created under pension plans. The advance of union control 
in this area can be expected to be slow as opposition is quite strong. 
Traditional management attitudes and currently prevailing conditions 
can be illustrated by practices of the U. S. Steel Corporation.
The original pension plan negotiated by the United Steel Workers 
and U. S. Steel established a contractual obligation on the part of 
the firm to pay benefits in accordance with a formula contained in the 
plan. The company did not have to set up a pension fund under the 
agreement. It could have adopted a pay-as-you-go policy had it wished, 
but financial prudence led to the establishment of a fund as a more 
convenient way of providing for foreseeable pension costs. Having 
been thus established, an official of the firm testified before a 
Senate Subcommittee in 1955 that, "Under these circumstances, since the 
determination of whether or not to create a trust is a matter of
3Ibid., p. 82.
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internal policy, we believe that the operations of the trust are of a 
4
like nature."
It bears mentioning that U. S. Steel has established something of 
an anomaly - a trust without a beneficiary or owner. The following ex­
change took place between Mr. Enders M. Voorhees, General Counsel for 
the firm, and Paul J. Cotter, Chief Counsel to the Senate Sub-Committee 
on Welfare and Pension Funds
"Mr. Cotter: Is that an irrevocable trust?
Mr. Voorhees: As far as the United States Steel Corporation is
concerned, it is irrevocable. We can;11 put a
finger on that money.
Mr. Cotter: What... is the purpose of the fund?
Mr. Voorhees: It is for the use of employees.
* # *
Mr. Cotter: But while it is for the use of the employees, they 
don't have a vested interest in it?
Mr. Voorhees: That is right."
One might easily wonder about the legal status of such a "trust." 
This problem will be more fully discussed in connection with funding of 
pension plans.
Some of the nation's labor leaders are beginning to challenge the 
"internal policy" method of pension fund management. While it was esti­
mated in 1956.that 86% of all pension funds were administered solely by
Testimony of Enders M, Voorhees, General Counsel for U. S. Steel, 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, contained 
in Hearings on E>. Res. 40, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, Part 3, p. 1171.
5Ibid.. p. 1171-1172.
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employers, it seems inevitable that unions will gain more control in
this area in the future.
There are two concepts of pensions and pension funds which bear
upon the validity of the trade unionist’s claim to a right to share in
pension fund management.
One concept, which might be called the "human depreciation" view,
has been espoused for many years. In 1912, one author wrote that:
It might be added that from the standpoint of the whole 
system of social economy no employer has a right to engage 
men in any occupation that exhausts the individual's in­
dustrial life in ten, twenty, or forty yearsj and then 
leave the remnant floating on society at large as a 
derelict at sea,^
A similar philosophy was later advanced by John L. Lewis of the
United Mine Workers (see Chapter II, p. 23), and the President's Steel
8
Industry Board echoed this view in 1949.
If the concept that a pension represents a depreciation cost is 
accepted, then it appears that it should be the prerogative of the firm 
to decide how to meet that cost. It would logically follow, therefore, 
that management should have exclusive control over any fund that they 
might choose to create.
A second concept of pensions, however, gives unions a strong
Final Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th 
Congress, 2d Sess., 1956, p. 14.
^Lee Welling Squiers, Old Age Dependency in the United States, 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912), p. 272.
g
The Steel Industry Board, Report to the President of the United 
States on the Labor Dispute in the Basic Steel Industry, Sept. 10, 
1949, p. 10.
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argument that they have a right to participate in pension fund manage­
ment. According to this concept, pensions are "deferred wages.11 The 
present practice of "package" bargaining, under which the firm agrees to 
pay advances of so many cents per hour and then allows the union consid­
erable leeway in determining the form in which the increase will be 
taken, lends credence to this concept.
United States Steel, while strongly opposing union participation 
in fund management, appears to hold this view of contributions to 
pension funds. In a formal statement submitted to the Senate Sub­
committee on Welfare and Pension Funds, the firm stated:
The funding of current service costs starts out by 
recognizing that the cost of an employee's service is 
greater than the amount currently paid to him as 
wages because, as he works, he concurrently establishes 
a possible claim to a pension. In a sense this is a 
claim to more pay for the same work; it is therefore 
deemed to be a part of the cost of that work and hence 
a part of the cost of the product resulting from that 
work.^
Of course, what U. S. Steel thinks of as the cost of labor is the 
wage of labor to an employee, and therefore, rightfully his. Conse­
quently, through his representatives, he has a valid claim to the right 
to participate in the management of his "deferred wages."
Whichever concept is accepted, unions are currently pressing for 
the right to become joint administrators of pension funds. They 
reason that the pension money really belongs to the wprkers and that 
the worker's representatives should therefore share in making decisions 
which affect their funds.
9
Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, o£. cit., p. 1171.
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The AFL, before the 1955 reunion with the CIO, stated that "union
representatives have as much right to a voice in the management of the
funds as if the workers had set up the fund entirely through their own
10
resources."
Walter Reuther has long advocated joint control of pension funds,
Testifying in support of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
of 1958, Reuther commented that "It is incredible that we should know
as little as we do about the billions of dollars in investments repre-
11sented by these plans," He argues that the money in the pension
fund belongs to the workers and is being held in trust for them.
Consequently, he believes that employees should have more control over
the use of the funds. He has advocated that automobile industry
pension funds be invested in housing and other community facilities in
12
areas where automobile workers live.
Growing union pressure will probably bring about a greater degree 
of union participation in pension fund management. Changes, if they 
come, can be expected to be slow and evolutionary in nature; no over­
night revolution appears in the offing,
C, Settlement of Disputes Under Joint Administration 
Although, as previously noted, the employer has final authority 
with regard to pension benefits under some plans, an increasing number
^American Federation of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining, a Reference Guide for Trade Unions, (no date), p, 3.
Cited in Paul Harbrecht, Pension Plans and Economic Power, (New York: 
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1959), p, 96,
11
Senate Subcommittee, o£. cit., p. 1175,
12Harbrecht, ojj. cit., p. 98,
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of plans provide for some degree of employee participation in making de­
decisions which deal with eligibility and benefits, to be received. At 
present, in fact, about two-thirds of collectively bargained plans
provide for some type of pension committee composed of an equal number
13
of members appointed by the employer and b y  the union.
The following is typical of pension plan clauses establishing 
such a board:
There shall be established a central Board of Administration 
hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed of six members, 
three appointed by the Corporation and three by the Union...
Either the Corporation or the Union at any time may remove 
a member or alternate appointed by it and may appoint a 
member of alternate to fill any vacancy among members or 
alternates appointed by it.-^
Plans commonly provide that deadlocks between corporation members
and union members of the board will be broken by an impartial chairman;
The Corporation and the Union shall mutually agree upon and 
select an Impartial Chairman, who shall serve until requested 
in writing to resign by three Board Members,
The Impartial Chairman will not be counted for the purpose 
of a quorum, and will vote only in case of a failure of the 
Corporation and Union by vote through their representatives 
on the Board to agree upon a matter which is properly before 
it. I .  U  «  *  «
The decision of the Board is generally final and binding on both 
parties. Typically:
^ Ibid., p. 47.
■^Commerce Clearing House, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans and 
Clauses, Chicago, 1957, p. 72.
15Ibid.. p. 72.
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There shall be no appeal from any ruling by the Board which 
is within its authority. Each such ruling shall be final 
and binding on the union and its members, the employee or 
employees involved, and on the Corporation.
Elsewhere, this same plan states that no matter respecting the 
pension plan "shall be subject to the grievance procedure established 
in the collective bargaining agreement between the Corporation and 
the Union.
This plan also spells out the authority of the Board which,
typical of such Boards, includes: (1) review of applications for
pensions; (2) the handling of complaints regarding an employee's age,
service, or computed benefit; (3) providing employees with information
regarding service credits, and; (4) settlement of disputes over per-
18
manent disability claims.
Although the above plan clauses are cited as typical of dispute
settlement machinery and of the scope of authority of such joint boards,
other methods are occasionally utilized. Some plans provide for the
selection of permanent or ad hoc outside umpires, some resort to the
services of the American Arbitration Association, while a few provide
19
that the regular grievance procedure machinery shall be used.
1®Ibid., p. 72. 
17
Ibid.
19Dearing, 0£, cit., p. 97, and Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 47
Eligibility Requirements ™
All pension plans establish conditions which must be met in order 
for an employee to become eligible for a benefit under the plan. 
Principal among these requirements are provisions that require some 
minimum period of continuous service and some minimum age of the 
employee, and, often, special provisions which apply to those who become 
disabled or retire early. Additionally, many plans provide that an 
employee may continue work after normal retirement age at the employer's 
option. Where this is allowed, the plan usually has a compulsory 
retirement age, commonly 70 years.
A. Normal Retirement Age
Normal retirement age may be defined as the earliest age at
which an employee may retire with full benefits under the normal
benefit formula of the plan. Under most plans, the normal retirement
age is 65, assuming that the employee has otherwise qualified for a
benefit. In a recent study by the Department of Labor, only 20 out of
a sample of 300 plans had a normal retirement age either higher or 
20
lower than 65. Of this 20, two set age 70 as the normal retirement
age, fifteen age 60, one age 62, one age 55, and one allowed normal
retirement benefits whenever an employee's age plus service added to 
21
80. The prevalence of age 65 as the normal retirement age no doubt
20U. S. Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining; Normal Retirement. Early and Disability Retirement,
Fall, 1959, BLS Bui. 1284, p. 18.
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reflects the fact that this is the age at which benefits become avail­
able to a covered male under the Social Security Act. .
The normal retirement age takes on added importance when it 
influences a worker 1s rights under other plan provisions. Many plans 
which have vesting provisions, for instance, provide that full vesting 
occurs only when normal retirement age is reached. Plans with early 
retirement provisions commonly pay benefits which decrease in some 
proportion as retirement occurs before normal retirement age. Also, 
there appears to be a current trend toward making the normal retirement 
age and the compulsory retirement age the same. The Bankers Trust
Company found that this was the case in 79% of the plans surveyed in a
22
1959 study and in 91% of the plans included in a 1965 'study,. These 
matters will be more fully discussed later in this chapter,
B , Minimum Service Requirements
In addition to the age requirement, most plans also require some 
minimum period of "unbroken" or "continuous" service. As Table III-l 
indicates, over three-fourths of the plans included in a 1959 
Department of Labor study had some minimum service requirement. Some 
72 of the 300 plans specified age only as a condition of eligibility. 
This figure is somewhat misleading, however, as most of the firms in­
volved follow a policy of not hiring workers over 45 or 50 years of 
23
age. The result is that by the time they have reached the usual re­
tirement age of 65, 15 or 20 years of service with the firm has been
22Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans, 
New York, 1965, p. 10,
23BLS Bui. 1284, p. 4
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accumulated. About 25% of the plans called for ten or less years of 
service; slightly more than one-half specified 10-15 years, reflecting 
the patterns set by the automobile (10 years) and steel (15 years) in­
dustries. The remaining plans either require more than 15 years 
service - up to 30 in one plan - or provide some alternative method of 
computing eligibility.
Table III-l. Minimum Requirements for Normal Retirement in Selected 
Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Fall, 1959.
Minimum Requirements Number of .Plans Workers (1,000)
All Plans 300 4,672.7
Age Only 72 644.7
Age and 1Service 216 3,903.6
Age 55 and 10 years 1 3.0
Age 60 and 12 years 1 4.0
Age 60 and 15 years 1 10.0
Age 60 and 20 years 8 471.8
Age 65 and 2 years 1 180.0
Age 65 and 5 years 2 43.0
Age 65 and 6 years 4 29.0
Age 65 and 10 years 64 1,249.0
Age 65 and 12 years 1 16.2
Age 65 and 15 years 98 1,051.2
Age 65 and 18 years 1 10.0
Age 65 and 20 years 21 678.9
Age 65 and 25 years 9 137.8
Age 65 and 30 years 1 7.5
Age 70 and 20 years 2 8.4
Age and Participation 6 29.0
Age 65 and 5 years 2 11.2
Age 65 and 10 years 2 6.6
Age 65 and 15 years 2 11.2
Alternative Requirements 6 95.4
Source: U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. 1284, Table 6, p. 18
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In determining what constitutes a year's service for the purpose of
establishing pension eligibility, various methods are utilized. In
plans negotiated by the United Automobile Workers, 1700 compensated
hours or more during a calendar year is sufficient to earn credit as
one year of service. (52 x 40 = 2,080, so a worker must be compensated
for slightly more than 80% of a normal work year). Plans in the steel
industry require only that some compensated service occur during the
course of a year. Some plans use a specified amount of pay during a
24year as the yardstick.
C. Early Retirement
An increasingly large number of plans allow an employee to retire
before reaching the normal retirement age. A 1952 Department of Labor
25
study found that 166 of 300 plans had early retirement provisions; 
a comparable 1959 study showed that 224 of 300 plans provided for early 
retirement.^ It is quite common to require some additional condition 
of eligibility for those who wish to retire early. The employers con­
sent, rarely required for normal retirement, is often required. Some
plans specify impaired capacity as a condition; others require that the
27
employee face layoff or job loss.
24
Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 20.
25U. S, Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining, BLS Bui. 1147, 1953, p. 15.
BLS Bui. 1284, p. 30.
27Ibid.
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The Department of Labor estimates that about 2 out of 3 workers
under plans are covered by early retirement provisions. Such provisions
were found to be practically universal in the lumber, rubber, primary
metal, fabricated metal, paper, tobacco, petroleum, transport equipment,
communications, and utility industries. They are almost non-existent
28
in the apparel, hotel, and restaurant industries, however.
Early retirement benefits are always less than benefits which 
are available at normal retirement age. Formulas used to compute 
early retirement benefits vary, but in every case the employee receives 
a monthly benefit which decreases as his age at retirement falls short 
of the normal retirement age. Table III-2 shows the method used to 
compute early retirement benefits in the steel and automobile in­
dustries. While other methods are used, all achieve similar results.
Table III-2. Early Retirement Benefits as a Percent of Normal Retire­
ment Benefits in the Basic Steel and Automobile 
Industries (1959)
Retirement Age Basic Steel 
(actuarial reduction)
Automobile 
(0.60 percent per 
month reduction)






Source: U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. 1284, p. 31,
28Ibid.
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Of the 224 plans in the 1959 sample which had early retirement pro­
visions, about three-fifths allowed an early retiree to delay receipt 
of his benefit until age 65. In such a case, the benefit is increased
by approximately 50%, but remains less than the benefit which would have
29
been available had employment continued until normal retirement age.. 
Hypothetically then, a worker who might get $100 per month at normal 
retirement age could currently receive perhaps $60 by accepting retire­
ment at age 60, but would be entitled to a $90 benefit if receipt was 
deferred until age 65.
D. Special and Disability Retirement
A small number of plans provide that an employee may become
eligible for a pension prior to the achievement of normal retirement
age if some special condition is satisfied or if the worker becomes
disabled. Benefits available under these circumstances usually exceed
by a significant amount the early retirement benefit to which an ef-
30
fected employee might be concurrently entitled.
The objective of the "special" early retirement programs is to
provide larger benefits to early retirees whose separation from
employment is involuntary. Employees are generally placed in this
category in a limited number of situations such as may arise when an
employer initiates the retirement of a worker, where the employee is
31




31 Ibid" , "p. 34
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The 1959 Department of Labor study of 300 plans contained 25 with
such provisions. Age and service requirements were usually the same as
for early retirement, but, as mentioned above, the pension amount was
substantially greater. Inmost of these plans, the regular retirement
benefit formula became operative when the employee reached normal re- 
32
tirement age.
A 1964 study of 15,818 plans found that 1,051 of the plans 
(covering 2.7 million workers) provided for special early retirement. 
Plans with this type provision were most common in agreements negoti­
ated by the Steel Workers, Automobile Workers, Rubber Workers, and
33
United Packinghouse Workers unions. The conditions under which 
special early retirement was available under these plans are reflected 
in Table III-3.
Insofar as the benefit amount is concerned, about half of these
plans provided a special retiree with a pension equal to the normal
retirement benefit, while the other half gave benefits either double
or somewhat larger than the normal retirement benefit. In any of these
cases the benefit available would exceed the benefit under the regular
early retirement provision. Also, normal retirement benefits were pay-
34
able when the worker reached the normal retirement age.
■^Ibid., p. 35.
33U. S. Department of Labor, Labor Mobility and Private Pension 
Plans, BLS Bui. 1407, June, 1964, p. 31.
34
BLS Bui. 1407, p. 33.
Table III-3. Conditions Under Which Special Early Retirement is Available.
Special Early Retirement Conditions Plans Workers (1,000)
Plans with Special Early Retirement ijOsi1 2,67a1
At Employers' Request 818 1,429
By Mutual Consent 498 1,886
Terminated (shut-down) 128 1,013




Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Labor Mobility and Private Pension 
Plans, BLS Bui. No. 1407, June, 1964, p. 31.






One respected authority in the field expects special early retire-
35
ment provisions to become much more common. In the past, the steel 
and automobile industries have been pattern setters and, as- previously 
noted, this type provision is already quite prevalent in these in­
dustries.
Disability retirement is similar to special early retirement in 
that both are contingent upon some special condition and that both 
provide a pension benefit which may differ from the benefit to which 
an employee might otherwise be entitled.
In a 1959 study, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 
approximately 90% of all workers covered by negotiated single
36employer plans were protected by a disability retirement provision.
Another study covering plans negotiated in the period from 1960 to
37
1965 showed that 94% of these plans provided disability pensions.
Under most of these plans, the worker must be disabled for a
certain length of time, usually six months, by a physical infirmity
which renders him, to some degree, incapable of performing his usual
duties. In addition, the employee is usually required to meet either
38
an age or service requirement, or both, to qualify.
35Bernstein, oj>. cit., p. 23.
36
BLS Bui. 1284, p. 35.
■^Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement 
Plans, New York, 1965, p. 17.
38BLS Bui. 1284, p. 35,
When compared with early retirement requirement, the age require­
ment tends to be lower while the service requirement tends to be
39longer. Three-fourths of all plans have no age requirement at all.
40
For those that do, age 50 and 55 are most common. Service require­
ments are almost universal, however. Table III-4 shows age and service 
requirements for 70 plans included in a recent study by the Bankers 
Trust Company of New York. Several pronounced trends are revealed by 
comparing the results of a similar study covering plans negotiated in 
the period from 1956 to 1959 with plans negotiated in the period from 
1960 to 1965.
Table III-4. Disability Retirement Provisions.
Retirement Provision 1960-65 Plans 1956-59 Plans
Age 50 After 15 Years Service 10% 16%
15 Years Service Only 38% 54%
10 Years Service Only 33% 1%
Other Age and Service Requirement 13% 13%
No Disability Retirement Provided 6% 16%
Source: Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement 
Plans, New York, 1965, p. 17.
Particularly evident is the increase in the proportion of plans
having disability retirement provisions. It increased from 80% in 
41
1953-55 to 84% in 1956-59, and to 94% in 1960-65. Another trend is
39Bankers Trust Co., 0£. cit., p. 17.
40
BLS Bui. 1284, p. 37.
41Bankers Trust Co., 0£, cit., p. 17.
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toward liberalization of service requirements. In 1956-59, plans re­
quiring 15 years service predominated; in 1960-65, one-third required 
10 years service.
Insofar as the benefit amount is concerned, the disability pension
is equal to the normal retirement benefit in most plans. In the few
42
that differ, most provide benefits that are higher. In more than
half of the plans, the disability benefit is reduced by the amount of
other disability benefits received, such as Workmen's Compensation.
43
There is a trend toward elimination of such offsets, however.
Benefits To Bfe Received
To a retiring employee probably the most important element of a 
pension plan is the method of computing the benefit and the amount 
thereof. Most authorities believe that the benefit should equal 
approximately 50%, of the employee's money wage during the last few
44
years of employment. There has so far been little effort to adjust 
benefits to reflect price level changes. However, the periodic re­
negotiation of most plans probably results in some adjustments made on 
the basis of the changing purchasing power of the dollar. If such is 
the case, the need for built-in adjustment machinery is minimized.
■ One writer estimates that a retirement plan which, when combined 
with OASDI benefits, provides a gross benefit equal to 507. of gross
42BLS Bui. 1284, p. 38.
43Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 17.
^Strong, op. cit., p, 42 and Dan M. McGill, Fundamentals of 
Private Pensions, (Homewood,„Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964),
l?: 59.------------ —
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pre-retirement income will give an employee a spendable retirement in­
come equal to 65% of disposable income prior to retirement. This 
apparent incongruity results from the fact that disposable income more 
nearly approximates gross income after retirement than it does before 
retirement. For the retiree, gross and spendable income are brought 
closer together because: (1) numerous payroll deductions cease;
(2) no income tax is collected on OASDI benefits, and; (3) the retiree
45
falls into a lower income tax bracket.
For the most part, pension plans now in effect do provide retire­
ment income which meets the 50 percent test. Also, the great majority
of industrial plans provide a retirement income equal to or greater 
than the "modest but adequate" income for a retired couple as computed
by the Department of Labor. For most areas the Department found that
46
$3,000 a year would be sufficient to maintain an aged couple. A
review of the statistics used in arriving at this figure indicates
that the $3,000 may be more "modest" than "adequate" however. The
life of a washing machine is projected at 15 years; the couple is
allocated 64<? per year for pots and pans; the television set must be
47
kept operational on $1.22 per year. Expenditure levels such as 
these could hardly be expected to allow most couples to maintain any­
thing near their accustomed standard of living.
^Strong, 0£. cit., p. 41.
^Margaret S. Stotz, "The BLS Interim Budget for a Retired 
Couple," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 83, No. 11, 1960, p. 1142.
47Ibid., p. 1155.
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It is true, however, that the need for cash income is generally 
less for an aged couple than for the young. Many will have their home 
paid for by age 65. It is a common practice to write life insurance 
programs so that policies are paid up by retirement age. Children are 
likely to have become financially independent and possibly capable of 
contributing to the support of the parents. Many will have sources of 
income other than that provided by retirement plans. Finally, it is 
generally accepted that needs diminish with advancing age. The newly 
inaugurated Medicare program provides protection in the one area in 
which needs are most likely to increase.
As will be discussed later, some plans are designed to provide a 
retirement income which is at least partially determined by earnings 
before retirement. Under such a system, retirement income is to a 
certain degree tied to a retiree's attained standard of living.
Other plans provide benefits independent of past earnings but which 
are strongly influenced by years of service. This latter type plan 
obviously gives less consideration to maintaining a worker's pre­
retirement standard of living than does those influenced by earnings. 
Of course, where seniority is the basis of advancement, which is often 
the case where there are negotiated plans, years of service and 
earnings tend to advance together. Roughly, the same result may be 
achieved by the different approaches.
Before delving into the methods of computing benefits, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two manners in which a plan's under­
taking may be expressed. Only one of these will be germane to this 
study.
The obligation assumed by the employer may take two forms. One 
approach is referred to as a defined contribution plan under which the 
firm asstimes the responsibility of making fixed periodic contributions 
to a pension fund. The benefit to be received is treated as a variable 
factor and depends primarily on the number of retirements under the 
plan and the earning experience of the fund. This type plan is very 
rarely found among industrial retirement systems. It is most preva­
lent among public retirement plans and plans established by public
utilities and non-profit institutions to whom it is attractive because
48
the outlay is known m  advance.
The second type plan may be referred to as a defined benefit plan. 
Under this arrangement, the benefit is established by formula and the 
contribution is treated as the variable factor. The following discus­
sion is concerned only with defined benefit type plans as this is the 
arrangement found in industrial pension systems.
There are three methods of computing benefits currently in vogue. 
One method actually requires no computation as it provides for a flat 
monthly benefit once eligibility has been established. This method is
commonly used by craft unions of the AFL-CIO and by the Teamsters 
49Union. This method of arriving at benefits payable will be of little
^McGill, o£. cit., p. 61.
49U. S. Department of Labor, Digest of One-Hundred Selected 
Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Winter 1957-58, BLS Bui, 
No. 1232, p. 4 and U. S. Department of Labor, Digest of One-Hundred 
Selected Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining, Spring, 1961,
BLS Bui. No. 1307, passim.
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importance to the present study as the plans to be examined herein all 
cover industrial workers.
Another method of computing benefits is by formula based on earn­
ings and service. Finally, benefits may be computed by giving a fixed 
monthly benefit for each year of service without regard to past 
earnings. These two latter methods are discussed in some detail below.
A. Benefits Determined by Formula Based on Average Earnings 
and Years of Service
Computation of benefits on the basis of earnings during past 
employment is based upon the philosophy that an employee should receive 
a benefit which is in some way correlated with both earnings and 
service. Such a benefit formula typically provides that the monthly 
pension shall be a given percent (usually 1 to 1%%) of average monthly 
earnings during the last ten years of employment times years of 
service. This type formula has come to be known as the "steel pattern" 
as it is commonly used in plans negotiated by the United Steel Workers 
and the nation's major steel firms. A limit is often set on the years 
of service which may be used in computing the benefit. In the 1961 
USW - U. S. Steel agreement, no more than 35 years service may be used 
in the computation. An $80 offset against Social Security benefits 
was also p r o v i d e d U n d e r  these conditions, a worker would be 
eligible for a gross pension (OASDI plus private plan benefit) of 
$197, assuming:
50U. S. Department of Labor, BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 34.
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a. 1% of average earnings is taken
b. $500 per month was the workers' average earnings during 
the last 10 years
c. The employee had 30 years of credited service
d. The worker is eligible for $127 OASDI benefit (minus 
$80 offset).
A variant of this type benefit formula is used by the Aluminum
Workers. The 1961 Aluminum Workers - Alcoa contract provided ‘that the
annual pension would be 1.25 percent of total past earnings. Total
earnings were limited, however, to wages received during the last 40
years. A man with 30 years service who had averaged $5,000 per year
would thus have total earnings of $150,000, 1,25% of which is $1,875.00.
The monthly private pension would therefore be $156.25. This plan also
51
allowed an $80 OASDI offset. As will be discussed later, there is 
a trend toward elimination of the offset against OASDI benefits.
B. Benefits Determined by Fixed Monthly Benefit for Each Year 
of Service Without Regard to Earnings
A large number of industrial pension plans provide that the 
monthly benefit shall be determined by multiplying a fixed sum by 
years of service. The emphasis here is of course on service. All 
workers who have equal service receive the same benefit under this type 
plan, irrespective of what differences may have existed between their 
wage rates before retirement. This type benefit formula is commonly 
used by the United Automobile Workers and is therefore known as the 
"automobile pattern."
Where this formula is used, the flat amount may vary by time 
periods. For instance, the plan negotiated by Ford Motor Company and
51BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 36.
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the Automobile Workers in 1961 provided that the monthly benefit would
be service times $2.50 for years of service after December 31, 1958,
$2.43 for service during 1958, and $2.40 for each year of service prior
52
to January 1, 1958.
It is common for the fixed amount to be raised somewhat in each 
succeeding three-year contract. The raises accrue primarily to future 
retirees however, since they are seldom retroactive. It is obvious in 
the Ford plan mentioned above, that a man who retired after 1958 would 
get a larger pension than a man of equal service who retired prior to 
that year.
To make benefit increases retroactive would undoubtedly place an 
onerous burden on an employer whose past funding practice was based 
on lower benefit levels. Too, unions are necessarily more responsive 
to the desires of present membership than to past members.
Some plans differentiate between "past service" and "future 
service" in computing benefits. As used in the plans, "past service" 
indicates service prior to plan adoption, while "future service" 
refers to service after plan adoption. Thus, under a plan adopted-in 
1950, all service after that time would be regarded as future service. 
The distinction is important in plans that make the differentiation 
since past service yields a smaller benefit for the same amount of 
service and earnings than does future service. As the plans get older, 
the distinction will become less and less significant as fewer and 
fewer employees will have "past service." The distinction is often
52 Ibid.
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necessary to avoid having a firm assume a full blown pension obligation 
without the benefit of past funding. It will undoubtedly continue to 
appear in new plans.
C. Special Payments Under the Steel Formula
Steel industry plans since 1960 have contained provisions for
special one-time payments to retirees. The steel plans call for a
lump-sum payment equal to thirteen weeks pay at the time of retirement.
It has been estimated that the special payments would run from $1,300 
53
to $1,500. The 1962 U. S. Steel - United Steelworkers' agreement 
provided extended vacations for employees on the upper half of the 
seniority list. An employee may forego the long vacations and defer 
receipt of the vacation pay until retirement if he chooses. The lump­
sum payment may therefore exceed the figure quoted above by a
54substantial amount.
A few plans outside the steel industry have been amended to
include this type special payment. Nothing describable as a trend
has developed, however. The most recent automobile industry plans con-
55
tain no such provision.
D. Survivor Benefits
Regardless of how the benefit is computed, its amount at normal 
retirement age may be affected by survivor benefits which are being 
made available to an increasing number of retirees. Under a plan
^Statement by USW President David McDonald in the New York 
Times, Jan. 6, 1960, p. 43,
"^Bernstein, ojd. cit., p. 31.
"^Ibid. , p . 36.
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without such provisions or for an employee who does not elect certain 
options, all private pension benefits cease at the death of the pen­
sioner. The result is that the widow is left solely dependent on the 
survivor's benefit under the Social Security system (currently 82%% of 
the husband's primary benefit, or a maximum of $138.60). Even this 
benefit is payable only if the widow is "aged" (over 62) or has de­
pendent children. A "young" widow without dependents receives no 
benefit until age 62. The result is that, there is a considerable gap 
in pension coverage for millions of workers and their dependents, most 
of whom no doubt assume that they are fully protected against income
loss during old age. Although one writer professed in 1952 to be
56
"really astonished" that this gap has been allowed to remain, efforts
to close it have only just recently been made.
Pension plans may provide protection for survivors in two ways:
(1) under provisions by which death benefit payments automatically are
made to survivors upon the death of the pensioner, and; (2) by joint
and survivor options which allows the worker the option of surrendering
57part of his regular pension to provide protection for survivors.
The first mentioned type of death benefit may take a variety of 
forms, none of them dependent on the prior choice of the worker.
They are integral parts of the plan and so automatically commence upon 
the death of a retiree. Some plans provide for lump-sum payments to
“^ Hilary Seal, "Are Widows' and Orphans' Benefits Practicable," 
Journal of Commerce, June 12, 1952, p. 26.
57u. s. Department of Labor, Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining: Benefits for Survivors, Winter 1961-62, BLS Bui. No.
1334, 1962, p. 1.
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the worker's beneficiary immediately following his death. Some plans 
provide that the widow will receive some portion of the worker's pension 
until she dies, or, in some cases, re-marries. Finally, a plan may 
contain a device known as "payment certain" under which a pensioner is 
guaranteed a minimum number of pension payments - often 60. Should he 
die before receiving the full number of guaranteed payments, those re­
maining are made to his beneficiary. Should he live to collect the
"payment certain" in full, further benefits are coincident with his 
58
lifetime.
In 1962, it was estimated that about 1 out of 6 industrial workers 
were under plans which provided some form of death benefit. Eligi­
bility for such a benefit was commonly dependent on the fulfillment
59of some age and/or service requirement.
Possibly more important in providing protection for survivors is
the joint and survivor's option under which the worker is allowed to
choose to receive a reduced benefit until his death, following which
a previously determined benefit is payable for life to his designated*
joint annuitant. The following is the type of pension plan provision
which allows such an option;
An employee may, before the due date of the first payment 
of his normal disability, or early pension, elect to 
convert such pension into an optional form of benefit of 
equivalent actuarial value,60
58Ibid., p. 2 
59jbid., p. 4 
60 Ibid.
A number of plans make the option available only in case of normal 
retirement, so that employees who retire early or because of disability 
lose the right of election.^
As indicated above, the worker who opts for the survivor benefit 
must accept a lower regular pension because of the additional obliga­
tion which is assumed by the plan. The amount by which the normal 
benefit is reduced depends on the age and sex of both the pensioner 
and his joint annuitant at the time of the worker's retirement.
Standard actuarial tables are used to make these computations, so that 
a pensioner with a young female joint annuitant would receive a 
benefit considerably reduced as a result of exercising such an option. 
To leave his wife a benefit equal to one-half his own, a man retiring
at age 65 would receive a benefit reduced by about 20%. (This assumes
62
the wife to be 5 years younger than her husband).
Under the 1961 automobile industry agreements, the regular
pension is reduced by only 12%%. The cost of providing the larger
benefit is absorbed by the companies. Too, only a spouse may be named
as beneficiary, whereas, under most plans the worker can name anyone
63with an insurable interest as beneficiary.
To avoid adverse selection, all plans require that the option be 
exercised before the attainment of some age or some specified point in
64
time before retirement. There is considerable variation among plans, 
but a common provision requires that the option be exercised three 
years before retirement or before reaching age 62. Some plans allow a 
worker to exercise the option after the specified age or point in time 
upon presentation of evidence of good health, usually a physical
• «.• 64 examination.
As desirable as joint and survivor options appear to be, they do
not seem to have been fully accepted by workers. Under one plan
covering several thousand workers, a union official reported that,
"Not a single retiring worker elected the option in our tool and die 
65
plan."
In explaining this lack of worker interest, two possibilities 
suggest themselves. First, lack of understanding of what the survivors 
option is designed to accomplish is probably widespread among workers. 
Indeed, many probably do not know the option exists. Since it must be 
exercised years in advance of retirement, for some the knowledge that 
it does exist probably comes too late. If ignorance is the problem,
it should not be too difficult to resolve. A second possible explana­
tion for the workers' disinterest is that exercise of the option leads 
to benefit reductions so great as to be unacceptable to the majority
of retirees. There appears to be a tendency to take the undiminished
benefit and gamble that it will be more favorable. The worker is
64Ibid., p. 10.
65James Bindle (Director, UAW Social Security Dept.), "Organized 
Labor's Objectives in Employee Benefits," 15th Annual Conference 
Council on Employee Benefits, 1961, p. 18, Cited in Bernstein,
. cit., p. 33.
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generally in a poor position to assess the odds of whether the undi­
minished benefit will yield a larger aggregate return than the joint 
benefit. Man's proclivity to accept present value in preference to
future value has been well established since the publication of Eugene
66
von Bohm-Bawerk's work in the latter part of the 19th. century. If 
the disainutioa of present benefits is the difficulty, perhaps some­
thing on the order of the automobile industry plan mentioned earlier 
is the answer.
E . Pre-Retirement Death Benefits
The survivor benefits discussed above apply only if the pensioner
dies after■retirement. They therefore provide no protection for the
survivors of an employee who dies shortly before retirement. Some
authorities believe that a pension plan that does not provide pre-
67
retirement death benefits is "deficient" and "inequitable." An 
attempt to correct this apparent short-coming has been made in a few 
industrial pension plans. The automobile industry appears to be the 
leader in this development. Six recently amended plans in that in­
dustry provide protection for survivors of employees who have attained 
age 60 with credited service of ten years, orfalternately age 55, if 
the decedent's age plus service totals 85. These plans pay a monthly
benefit to the surviving spouse that is about 40% of the benefit
„ 68
which would have been available had the deceased retired early.
88See Eugene von Bohm-Bawerk. Capital and Interest, Translated 
by Wm« Smart, (;New*Yor.kr-—Gt Ev Steckert arid Co. ] 1932), p.,. 259«.' (The 
original work appeared in Germany in 1884).
^Bankers Trust Company, oj>. cit., p. 21.
68Ibid.
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The provision of such benefits is an attempt to supplement group 
insurance which is seldom adequate to provide lasting economic security, 
to survivors. Thirteen percent of the negotiated industrial plans in­
cluded in a recent study (70 plans in all) had some type of :
69
pre-retirement death benefit. It is too early to judge whether 
these benefits will be made generally available to the nation's 
industrial workers.
F, Provisions for Minimum and Maximum Benefits
Many industrial plans contain provisions designed to insure that 
each employee will receive at least a subsistence level pension upon 
retirement. In some plans, the minimum is established by specific 
provisions while in some it is inherent in provisions dealing with 
eligibility and benefit computation. Possibly in no other area of 
pension planning is greater diversity to be found. Some of the more 
prevalent practices are outlined below, however, for illustrative 
purposes.
In those plans which have provisions specifically establishing a
minimum, the following clauses are cited as typical:
A pension granted to an employee who shall have had 
at least twenty-five years of continuous service at 
the time of his retirement shall not be at a rate of 
less than twelve hundred dollars per year and a 
pension granted to an employee who shall have had 
fifteen or more, but less than twenty-five years of 
continuous service at the time of his retirement, 
shall not be at a rate per year of less than that 
part of twelve hundred dollars which the number of 
years of his continuous service bears to twenty-five.
6^Ibid.
^Commerce.Clearing House, o£. cit., p, 313,
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This same contract provides that if the minimum monthly pension is 
less than $65 the firm may make an actuarially equivalent lump-sum 
payment.
Another contract states:
The minimum normal retirement allowance payable after 
Hay 1, 1950, shall be determined as follows:
(i) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (ii) 
below, the minimum normal retirement allowance shall 
be an amount equal to $12 for each year of creditable 
service not exceeding twenty years.
(ii) If a member has fifteen years or more of 
creditable service at retirement, his ftormal re­
tirement allowance shall in no event be less than 
an amount which, together with his social security 
benefits, shall equal $720 plus $48 for each year 
of creditable service in excess of fifteen;years 
but not exceeding twenty-five years.
This clause actually provides two methods of computing the minimum 
for an employee with between 15 and 20 years service. The amount of 
his social security benefit would determine which was more favorable,.
For plans which follow the automobile pattern discussed earlier, 
there is no necessity for a clause specifically establishing a 
minimum. Once a man has satisfied the 10-year eligibility requirement, 
some benefit is payable, however small. Thus, if the flat amount 
payable for each year of service was $2.50, the minimum pension auto­
matically would be $25.00 per month.
A minimum is established in the steel pattern plans by a clause 
practically identical to that under which the normal benefit is 
determined in the automobile industry. In the 1961 USW - U. S. Steel
^ Ibid., p. 314.
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contract for instance, the plan provided that the minimum would be 
$2.60 times years of service after December 31, 1959, and $2.50 times 
years of service prior to January 1, 1960. Maximum creditable service 
under the clause is 35 years. For low-wage, long-service employees,
the minimum formula yields a greater benefit than the regular percent-
/
72
of-earnings times years of service formula.
A great number of plans contain no minimum benefit clause. Of
the plans contained in a recent survey, 47% either contained no
minimum or provided for Social Security offsets which rendered the
73
minimum meaningless.
Plans covering industrial workers impose no maximum, per se, on
the pension benefit. In the automobile pattern plans, there is an
automatic limitation since the benefit is determined by multiplying
a flat dollar amount times years of service. The years of service
which an employee can accumulate is obviously finite. In those plans
which relate benefits to both compensation and years of service, there
has been no attempt to establish a maximum. Where they exist, always
in plans covering high income salaried personnel, they tend to be
74
quite liberal - ranging up to $50,000 per year. The purpose of such 
a provision is to provide a hedge against having contributions to the 
plan declared taxable by the Treasury on the basis of discrimination
72BLS Bui. No. 1307, p. 35.
73Bankers Trust Company, 0£. cit., p. 28 
^Ibid. , p . 30.
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in favor of highly paid employees.^ Tax-exempt qualification of a 
plan will be discussed later in this chapter.
G . Benefits Inclusive and Exclusive of Social Security Benefits 
Benefits under private plans may be integrated with OASDI benefits 
in two ways, the "excess" method and the "offset" method.
At present, both OASDI taxes and benefits are dependent upon 
income up to $6,600 per year. Once a worker passes this level, no 
additional taxes are paid on his behalf by either himself or his 
employer, nor are benefits affected by annual earnings in excess of 
this amount. The primary OASDI benefit is therefore higher as a per­
cent of pre-retirement income for an employee making less than $6,600 
annually than it is for a worker making more. In order to allow for 
benefits on roughly equal terms, the "excess" method of integration 
has been developed. In establishing rules to determine whether a plan 
is discriminatory in favor of high income personnel, the Treasury 
specified that a plan would not lose its tax exempt status if the
employer made contributions into a special pension plan for earnings
76
in excess of $6,600. Following this lead, a number of firms have 
established secondary plans into which contributions are made on 
earnings in excess of $6,600. These "excess" plans are commonly con­
tributory and optional with employees.
The excess method of integration is rare among plans covering 
industrial workers. Obviously designed for high income employees, it
^Commerce Clearing House, oj>. cit., p. 314. 
■^Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 401(a)(5).
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has been adopted almost exclusively for the benefit of salaried 
personnel ,77
The offset method of OASDI and private plan integration provides 
that all or some portion of the primary public benefit is to be 
deducted from benefits otherwise payable by the private plan. So, for 
example, a plan which provided a $300 monthly pension would entail a 
private benefit of only $132 if total offset was provided and if the 
worker was eligible for the maximum OASDI primary benefit of $168.
Many objections have been raised to the offset method. To many 
it seems poor psychology. The worker may feel that both the public and 
the private benefits are earned, and to have the one partially cancel 
the other generates ill will. The worker might very well argue that 
half of the OASDI benefit comes from his own contributions. This fact 
is sometimes recognized by providing that only half of the primary 
OASDI benefit will be deducted. Finally, under the offset scheme of 
things, the workers do not benefit by an increase in the OASDI 
benefit.78
Possibly because of these objections, offset provisions have been
recently eliminated from a large number of plans. More often the rule
than the exception in the early 1950s, one recent Department of Labor
study showed that only 20% of the employees included in the survey were
79
under plans with offset provisions. The trend toward making private
77Bernstein, oj>. cLt., p. 30.
^McGill, op. cit., p. 76.
79BLS Bui. No. 1284, p. 7.
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benefits independent of benefits under OASDI is expected to continue.
Financing Arrangements
A. Contributory versus Non-Contributory Flans
A contributory pension plan requires contributions from both the 
employer and the employee. Under a non-contributory plan, all funds 
are provided by the firm.
Insofar as negotiated plans are concerned, contributory plans 
have been gradually diminishing in importance. In 1950, it was esti­
mated that 757c. of all workers covered by pensions received these
81
benefits on a non-contributory basis. By 1963, this figure had
82
increased to 80%. Many writers believe that this movement toward
non-contributory plans results directly from the fact that employer
contributions to plans are tax deductible while employee contribu- 
83
tions are not. The 1949 Steel Industry Fact Finding Board based its 
recommendation for non-contributory plans on this basis. As the tax 
laws currently stand, a dollar contributed by the employer results in 
a larger benefit than an equal-cost contribution by an employee because 
the latter must contribute out of after-tax income. It was soon 
discovered that an employee could be given a "raise" equal to his
on
McGill, o£. cit., p. 76.
Ol
Evan Keith Rowe, Health, Insurance, and Pension Plans in 
Union Contracts, BLS Bui. No. 1187, p. 5.
82BLS Bui. No, 1407, p. 63.
Q Q
William Haddad, "Impact of Tax Policy on Private Pensions," 
in Dan M. McGill (ed.), Pensions: Problems and Trends (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), pT 76.
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pension contribution by having the employer assume the pension contri­
bution. An employer could therefore increase the take-home pay of an 
employee by a given amount with less cost than if the regular wage 
was increased. The trend toward non-contributory plans therefore
rests on an economic basis as well as the fact that AFL-CIO leadership
84
has been unanimous in advocating employer financed plans.
There are, however, some rather compelling arguments in favor of
85
jointly financed plans. For one thing, the worker generally has 
rights under a contributory plan that are not ceded him where the 
employer alone contributes. Upon separation (before retirement and 
for whatever reason) the employee can claim his own contributions plus 
interest (however nominal - 2 to 3% in most cases). If the deferred 
wage concept of pensions is accepted it might appear to be in the in­
terest of justice to give him all contributions made in his behalf, 
regardless of who made them. In practice, only his own contributions 
are returned unless he has gained a vested right. Further, vesting,
which is the right to a benefit financed by employer contributions even
86
after separation, is much more common in contributory plans. This 
is doubly important in view of the fact that employee contributions 
under a contributory plan are generally small in: relation to contri­
butions by the employer. It is a rare plan that calls for employee
87
contributions in excess of $100 annually.
^Bernstein, cit., p. 221,
®->These arguments are developed in some detail by Bernstein, 
o p. cit., pp. 217-223.
^^Sernstein, _op. cit., 217.
87BLS Bui. No. 1232, passim.
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The tax savings previously discussed has perhaps been given too 
much weight. The taxpayer with a wife and two children and a gross in' 
come of $4,000 to $5,000 simply does not pay that much in taxes.
Finally, benefits under contributory plans tend to be higher. 
Obviously, a given contribution by the employer will provide a larger 
benefit if matched to some extent by the employee.
A counter-argument against contributory plans is that they cannot 
be made compulsory and are therefore likely to result in adverse 
selection, with older workers joining and younger workers staying out. 
Several states, however, have employee retirement plans which are both 
contributory and compulsory. Requiring a worker to join such a plan 
is hardly more coercive than requiring him to join a union and pay 
dues, and in some cases, no more costly.
Whatever the relative merits of contributory versus non­
contributory plans, there is little logic in making employer 
contributions tax deductible while requiring employees to contribute 
in after tax dollars. The self-employed have been allowed to 
establish pension funds for themselves on a tax deductible basis
i
since 1962. In the same year, it was estimated that employee con-
88
tributions to pension funds was $440 million. Even if a 20% 
average tax rate is assumed, the revenue loss from exemption of these 
contributions would be only $88 million. In the long-run, the loss 
would be much less than this, as pension benefits resulting from the 
employee's contribution would be taxable.
®®U. S. Security and Exchange Commission, Corporate Pension 
Funds, 1962, Release No, 1902, Statistical Series, 1963, p. 3.
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It nevertheless appears that the tendency toward making pension
plans non-contributory will continue. Employers in large segments of
American industry have accepted the arrangement. Trade unions can be
expected to continue their opposition to contributory, plans, the fact
that they are committed to the contributory principle of the OASDI
89
program notwithstanding. Finally, if the practice of "package" 
bargaining continues to gain favor, the question will become less and 
less important.
B . Funding
As indicated earlier, one of the most controversial issues in 
pension planning involves funding. Some conflict arises over the 
funding method, i.e., just how much will be set aside and by whom, 
but more heat is generated over the issue of the funding agency and 
who shall control it.
Insofar as the funding method is concerned, the source of the dis 
agreement is easily pinpointed. By its very nature, a pension plan 
creates obligations which often run into millions of dollars. The 
precise amount of the obligation is always unknown, however, since 
many of the costs will not be met for decades and can be estimated 
only within a wide range of possibilities. Actuarial experience lags 
behind practice, and the periodic revision of plans aggravates the 
uncertainty. In recent years, wide fluctuations in fund earnings has 
confounded an already muddled situation.
" '89Nelson Cruikshank, "Some Labor Views on the Social Security 
Program" in Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, 
1953, p. 183,
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This uncertainty; as to the future costs and therefore the need
for current funding has led many industrial firms to adopt plans under
which the amount of funding is periodically computed, but never known
in advance. So long as the obligation assumed is highly uncertain,
there seems to be no alternative. And, so long as the benefit is fixed,
the contribution must be variable. The General Motors - UAW plans
contain the following provision:
The Corporation agrees to pay over irrevocably to the 
trustee or insurance company as of each anniversary of 
the effective date of the plan during the period of 
this agreement, contributions or payments for the pension 
plan in the amount.,, as determined and certified as of 
each anniversary date by one or more actuaries chosen 
by, but independent of, the Corporation, and qualified 
through Fellowship in the Society of Actuaries.
Other plans achieve essentially the same result as the General 
Motor's, plan by providing that the employer will put into the fund so 
many cents per hour or any portion thereof as may be needed to main­
tain the plan in a "sound actuarial condition," In these plans, the 
fixed cents-per-hour-worked serves as a maximum on the amount which the 
firm can be called upon to contribute in any given year.
As previously noted, the steel pattern plans obligate a firm only 
to pay pensions when due. Any fund established is at the discretion 
of the firm and can therefore be increased or diminished as management 
of the firm sees fit. Fiscal prudence has led to funding roughly 
equivalent to that in industries in which the contribution is
^ Supplemental Agreement Between General Motors Corporation and 
the UAW-AFL-CIO, 1958, Section 2(b).
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contractual, however. In cases such as this, practice is more impor­
tant than formal plan provisions.
The controversy over the funding agency cannot be solved by 
leaving the decision to the future, however. Nor can the matter of 
pension fund management be so easily disposed of. These decisions 
have to be made prior to the creation of a fund.
The financial institution which is selected to receive contribu­
tions is known as the funding agency. The contractual obligation
under which the funding agency operates is known as the funding 
91
instrument.
The Department of Internal Revenue makes it mandatory that the 
funding agency be distinct from the contributing firm if contributions 
are to be tax deductible. Whatever control that may be exercised over 
the fund must therefore be explicit in the funding instrument.
In industrial pension plans, the funding agency is almost univer-
92
sally a pension trust. Such devices as purchases of individual 
annuity contracts, group annuity contracts, and deferred annuity 
contracts are rapidly losing favor except among some public utilities 
and insurance firms. These devices are devised by life insurance 
companies to provide retirement income to those wishing to purchase a 
paid up annuity. Under the group annuity contract, contributions are 
not used to purchase individual annuity contracts, but are held in an 
undivided account. As each participant reaches retirement age or dies,
91McGill, ££. cit., p. Ill,
92Bankers Trust Company, oja. cit., p. 30.
77
an amount is withdrawn from the fund and used to provide individual
benefits. Under the group deferred annuity arrangement, no refund or
benefit is available should a participant die before annuity payments
commence. The purchase price of such an annuity is reduced by the
93
assumption of a given mortality rate among participants. Insurance 
companies favor such devices for obvious reasons, while the definitely 
determinable cost probably appeals to the regulated utility firms.
The pension trust as a funding agency will be the chief concern of 
this study since, as noted above, it is the device commonly used by 
industrial firms.
Under the pension trust arrangement contributions are made to a 
group of trustees which, as noted above, must constitute a legal 
entity separate and distinct from the contributing firm. The Internal 
Revenue Code requires that contributions be irrevocable so that monies 
once placed in the trust are forever beyond the reach of the firm.
The trust administers the fund and pays benefits according to provi­
sions in the funding instrument. This does not mean, however, that 
the firm exercises no control over the fund. Control over such 
matters as investment of the fund may rest with the contributing firm 
either through provisions in the funding instrument or the right to 
change trustees at will.
The explosive growth of pension trust funds has created a number 
of perplexing problems. The growing size of the pension funds promises 
to materially alter some of our basic economic relationships. At the
^McGill, o£, cit., p. 157,
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present time, estimates of pension fund assets vary from $70 to $80
billion. Further, they are increasing by about 10 percent annually, so
that by the end of this decade the figure will be in the $120 to $130 
94
billion range.
In the period from 1953 to 1957, corporate pension funds purchased
the equivalent of one-fifth of all the new corporate securities offered
for sale. If the comparison is limited to common stock, net purchases
by the pension trusts equaled 30 percent of the value of all such newly
95
issued securities. While the growth of such institutional purchas­
ing promises to add stability to the stock market, it also creates 
serious problems of concentrated economic power.
The problem of concentration is aggravated by another difficulty 
previously alluded to, i.e., just what is the legal nature of a pension 
trust. Economists have long mulled such problems as the concentration 
of power inherent in the nation's corporate structure and the increas­
ing separation of ownership and control. The advance of pension 
trusts add a new dimension to these difficulties. The trusts hold 
title to billions of dollars worth of property, but who owns the 
trusts? This is the problem. Insofar as the corporation or even the 
corporate holding company is concerned, there is, after all, an 
ultimate owner who in the final analysis can be identified and can 
control, however infrequently that power may be exercised. One writer 
refers to the pension trusts as "vast aggregations of wealth upon which
94
Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 245-46.
^Harbrecht, o£. cit., p. 229.
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many have claims but of which no one can call himself owner." Just 
as control has ceased to be an operating reality for many owners of 
stock, ownership itself is diminishing as a reality insofar as one 
thinks of ownership as ultimately residing in persons. A legal title 
ultimately held by a disembodied legal entity boggles the senses. Some 
new form of property law and rights will have to be developed. Pre­
viously established doctrines of trust law simply do not fit the 
situation.
To an ever increasing extent these funds are leaving 
the realm of usually understood trust principles and 
are posing an entirely new concept for dealing with 
property that has no parallel elsewhere in law.97
Possibly more important than establishing ownership is the problem 
of control over billions of dollars worth of property. The dangers of 
misuse are clear and present. Misuse of funds by the Teamster Union 
is well documented. In testimony before a Senate committee, it was 
revealed that Teamster pension funds had been used to support the in­
cumbent Montgomery Ward management in a proxy fight. One witness 
testified that the Teamsters were rewarded by a contract containing
98
provisions to which the firm had formerly been "unalterably opposed," 
The Laundry Workers Union allegedly engaged in similar improper
99
practices in collusion with insurance and employer representatives.
" ibid., p. 4.
"senate Report No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 67.
98Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds, Hearings 
on Senate Resolution 40, 84th Congr., 1st Sess., 1955, Part 3, p. 1170.
"ibid.
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While the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (which 
grew out of the above hearings) will probably prevent the more flagrant 
offenses, control over billions of dollars can be improperly used in 
many subtle and nefarious ways. And, even assuming competent and 
honest administration, the problem of concentration will remain.
The desire of unions to participate in pension fund administration 
has been previously discussed. Joint administration would provide an 
additional check on the management of trust funds, providing that one 
party does not resign its powers to the other. Joint administration 
might also fail on another score. Collusion between parties of sup­
posedly divergent interests is not unknown.
C. Vesting
Vesting may be defined as the right of an employee to leave the 
service of an employer prior to his normal retirement date without 
forfeiture of his accrued pension.
Vesting provisions of one type or another are almost universal in
industrial pension plans. In a 1965 survey, 94% of all plans examined
contained a vesting provision. Previous studies showed that in 1955
only 41% of plans provided some form of vesting, but by 1959 the
100
figure had grown to 82%. A plan without some type of vesting pro­
vision is rapidly becoming a rarity.
Vesting may be accomplished by any one of three methods: deferred 
full vesting; deferred graded vesting; and immediate full vesting.
100
Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 19.
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Under deferred full vesting, a worker who has satisfied certain 
age and/or service requirements retains a claim on all accrued bene-; 
fits, .payable,! in most>’cases, af normal retirement age. Thus* a 
long service employee who terminates at, say, age 50 becomes eligible 
for a pension from the firm upon retirement even though fifteen years 
may well have elapsed between his termination and his date of retire­
ment. The 1958 General Motors - UAW agreement states that any worker 
who terminates "shall, if such employee has attained age 40 but not age 
60, be eligible for pension commencing at age 65 provided the credited 
service of such employee at separation is at least 10 years." Under 
this plan, a worker may elect early retirement at age 60, which 
accounts for the "but not age 60" restriction. As with the normal 
retirement benefit in the automobile pattern plans, the benefit is 
computed by multiplying years of service times a flat benefit. Service 
prior to age 30 is not counted under the vesting provision, however.
Under deferred graded vesting, the worker acquires a claim to a 
certain percentage of accrued benefits, with the percentage increas­
ing as additional requirements are met. For instance, a plan may 
grant a vested right to 50 percent of accrued benefits after 10 year's 
service with an additional 10 percent vesting for each additional 
year of service. Under such a provision, deferred full vesting
results after 15 years of service. The following is offered as
101 "
typical of such a provision.
'^'''Commerce Clearing House, o£, cit., p. 323.
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In the event :a member ceases to be an eligible employee 
or in case of voluntary or involuntary termination of 
service for reasons other than early retirement, death, 
or disability, a member shall have a vested.interest in 
the amount of contributions paid or payable to the fund 
by the Company for the purpose of funding the member's 
benefits, plus interest, as computed by the actuary, in 
accordance with the following table:
Years of Service Percent of Equity Vested
Less than 10 Years 0%
Under immediate full vesting, a worker begins to accumulate
vested rights to the full extent of contributions on his behalf as
soon as he becomes a plan participant. No minimum age or years of
service is required. The apparent liberality of this type clause is
often restricted by denying the right to participate in the plan to
employees under 30 years of age.
Of these vesting methods, deferred full vesting is by far the
most common. A 1958 Department of Labor study of 174 plans showed
that 154 had deferred full vesting, 19 had deferred graded vesting,
102
and one had immediate full vesting.
There is considerable evidence that vesting provisions provide 
less actual protection than is commonly believed. In the view of one 








102BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 4.
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I don't think there is any feature in a plan that gives 
you more good for the money it costs than vesting, pro­
viding you set the vesting point where it doesn't cost 
you anything. And that is what you can do... With a 
typical type of vesting after 15 years to.20 years of 
service and the payment (sic) at age 40 or 45, the turn­
over is so negligible thereafter that the cost is ^
merely the absence of refunds you would otherwise get.
According to this philosophy, the age and service requirements
should be set so high as to effectively nullify the vesting provision.
What are the age and service requirements in industrial pension
plans? Is there any discernible trend to change these requirements?
These questions will be dealt with in turn as they obviously have a
direct bearing on the efficacy of vesting provisions.
Of the 174 plans studied by the Department of Labor in 1958, 13%
had a service requirement only. Roughly half of these required 10
years service, close to one-fourth required 15 years service, and the
104
rest required 20 or more years service. In a recent survey cover­
ing 652,638 automobile workers, 60% had less than 10 years service
105
and 75% had less than 15. Obviously, a substantial portion of 
these employees could not qualify for a vested benefit under the above 
requirements.
In the same Department of Labor study, 65% of the 174 plans con­
tained both an age and service requirement. Of these, about half
103Statement of John M. Hines, Director of Group Annuities, 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, before the 
California Personnel Management Association. Quoted in Bernstein, 
op. cit., p. 245.
104BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 7.
'^ -’Bernstein, o£. cit. , p. 246.
84
required age 40 and 10 years of service. More than one-fourth required 
age 40 and 15 years of service. The remaining plans had requirements 
ranging up to age 55 and 25 years of service.
The remaining 22% of the 174 plans in this study provided some
alternative minimum requirement, such as age 45 and 10 years service
106
or 15 years service regardless of age.
The adding of age requirements to the service requirement obviously 
restricts eligibility further. In a 1955 survey covering 1.8 million 
employees, only 11.4% of the workers under age 45 had 10 years of
service with one employer, and but 4.4% had service of 15 or more
107 _  , . . , .years. This survey covered seven metropolitan areas and is prob­
ably representative of industrial experience elsewhere. It thus 
appears that the majority of the nation's industrial workers fail to 
qualify for vesting because they cannot satisfy the age and service 
requirements.
On the question of whether the requirements for vesting are being 
relaxed, the answer is a qualified yes. Of 100 plans studied in 1961, 
eleven had liberalized the conditions for vesting in one way or 
another since 1958. While some of the changes were slight, a few were 
significant. One plan reduced the minimum service requirement by only 
one year. Four of the plans reduced the service requirement by 5 
years, however. Still, in none of them was it reduced to less than 10
106BLS Bui. No. 1259, p. 7.
107U. S. Department of Labor, Older Worker Adjustment to Labor 
Market Practices, Bureau of Employment Security Bulletin No. R151,
1956, p. 41.
years. The other changes served to bring the plans involved more into 
line with general practice, i.e., inordinately high age or service re­
quirements were reduced. There was no indication of a tendency to 
depart from the more or less standardized age requirements of 40 or 
45 or the usual service requirements of 10 or 15 years. The 1965 study 
by the Bankers Trust Company supports the conclusion that there is a
tendency to reduce requirements to these levels, but not to go below
108them. If this turns out to be the case, vesting may well be as
costless as indicated by the comment quoted earlier. And, it might be 
added, as devoid of benefits.
D. Tax Exempt Qualification
Employer contributions to pension plans are tax deductible if 
the plan meets certain requirements laid down by the Internal Revenue 
Service. The funds are later taxed as personal income to the pen­
sioner, however. Employee contributions to pension plans must be made 
out of after-tax income. Pension payments resulting from the employee's 
own contributions are not taxed when received, except to the extent 
that there are accumulated interim earnings. The tax exempt status of 
employer contributions has nevertheless encouraged the establishment 
of non-contributory plans as discussed earlier.
To qualify for tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue
109Code a pension plan must meet four broad requirements: (1) the
108Bankers Trust Company, o£. cit., p. 19.
1 no
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sections 401-404 and 501(a), 
as amended by 76 Stat. 809 (1962), establishes the criteria by which 
tax exempt status may be achieved.
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plan and contributions thereto must be for the exclusive benefit of the 
firm's employees; (2) coverage under the plan must not be discrimina­
tory in favor of officers1, stockholders, supervisory, or highly 
compensated employees; (3) it must be impossible for the firm to 
divert use of the funds to itself until all liabilities to employees 
and their beneficiaries have been s a t i s f i e d , a n d ;  (4) the pension 
fund and earnings thereon must be distributed to employees or their 
beneficiaries .'*''*''*' Whether or not a plan satisfies these requirements 
is largely a matter of Internal Revenue Service judgment. It is a 
common practice to submit new plans to the IRS for an advance ruling.
The Treasury Department has also developed administrative regu­
lations which must be adhered to by the contributing firm. Specifically, 
a plan will qualify for tax exempt status only if it is "a definite, 
written program and arragement which is communicated to the employees."
Further, the plan must be "permanent" and "provide systematically for
112
the payment of definitely determinable benefits...."
110The IRS has been quite liberal in allowing firms to invest 
pension funds in their own stock and bonds, however. The limits 
within which funds can be so used are rather ill defined thus far - 
the principal concern of the IRS appears to be prevention of practices 
inimical to the interest of covered employees. See "Investment of 
Pension and Profit Sharing Trust Funds in the Employer's Business 
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 45 Minn. Law Review 575 
(1961) .
IllBenefits accrued under a plan must vest when the plan is 
discontinued. Termination of a plan may, however, result in re­
covery of employer overpayments resulting from actuarial error.
To the extent that contributions are clearly excessive they are
not deductible when made. See Carroll W. Boyce, How to Plan Pensions.
(McGraw-Hill Book Co^, Inc., 1950), p. 181.
•'•■^Treasury Regulation Sections 1.401-1 (a) (2) , 1 ,401-l(b) (1) (i) 
and 1.401-l(b)(2), 1956.
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The "permanence" requirement has proven difficult to enforce. The 
Tax Court has been especially lenient in those cases in which an ade­
quate business reason for plan termination can be proven. The IRS has 
stressed the time factor in determining permanence, i.e., a plan 
terminated within a few years of its inception is suspect, while the
Court has been prone to give more weight to the circumstances under
113
which termination occurs.
Insofar as the "definitely determinable benefits" are concerned,
the employer must either submit a definite schedule of benefits or a
statement of contributions to be made. In the latter case, the IRS
requires the submission of an actuarial analysis of benefits which will
114
result from the contributions.
Obviously, tax exempt status is not achieved by the insertion of 
any particular provision in the plan. It derives from the nature of a 
plan's provisions when taken as a whole. If the overall plan meets the 
prerequisites outlined above, employer contributions are deductible 
from gross revenue in arriving at taxable income.
Pension plan provisions as discussed in this chapter will serve 
as the basis for comparing the several plans treated in Chapter IV.
113Lincoln Electric Co. vs. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 326 
(6th Cir. 1951) and McClintock-Trunkey Co. vs. Commissioner, 217 
F. 2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953). Cited in Bernstein, o£. cit., p. 199.
^■^Bernstein, o£. cit., p. 202.
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CHAPTER IV
A COMPARISON OF SEVERAL MAJOR PLANS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PROVISIONS
As indicated in Chapter I, this Chapter is devoted to analyzing 
and comparing pension plans in four major industries. Included are 
the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries.
The emphasis is primarily on the type of plan which is character­
istic of each of these industries, i.e., no particular firm within an 
industry is singled out for comparison with other firms in the same 
industry. This approach is taken because each of these industries has 
a more or less distinct pattern. Intra-industry comparison would 
therefore result in tiresome repetition of identical or near-identical 
plan provisions. The references made to individual firm plans are 
therefore primarily illustrative in nature and are not intended to 
convey the notion that the particular provision mentioned is in any 
way exclusive with that firm. In those cases in which the firm de­
parts from the industry's pattern, the departure is identified as such.
The analysis which follows coincides with the format established 
in Chapter III. Plan administration is considered first, with admin­
istration in each of the four industries considered in turn. This 
method is designed to highlight inter-industry differences, with some 
attention given to intra-industry differences where they are significant.
Following the examination of plan administration, the discussion 
moves on to: eligibility required; benefit formulae, and; 
financing arrangements. Each of these major topics are subdivided in 
accordance with the outline developed in Chapter III.
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The pension plans cited in this Chapter were all secured from the 
U. S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management and Welfare- 
Pension Reports. In each instance, the plan cited is the latest which 
has been placed on file with that Office and is therefore assumed to be 
currently in effect. All of the automobile industry plans became ef­
fective in late 1964. All of the steel industry plans date from 1962; 
the rubber industry plans from 1964. The petroleum refining industry 
plans bear various dates ranging from 1960 to 1966. Each plan is 
cited in full when it is initially referred to. Thereafter, plans are 
simply identified by the name of the firm.
Pension Plan Administration
The discussion which follows will be principally concerned with 
determining who administers the plan insofar as determining eligi­
bility and pension amount is concerned and how disputes arising over 
these matters are settled. The problem of control over pension funds 
is included in the section dealing with financing arrangements.
A. Administration in the Automobile Indus try
Insofar as individual firms are concerned, provisions dealing 
with plan administration are practically indistinguishable in the 
automobile industry. Although each of the references and quotations 
given below was taken from the plan of a particular firm, others from 
the industry could have easily been substituted.
With slight changes in wording, Chrysler, Ford, and General 
Motors all provide that: "There shall be established a Central Board 
of Administration hereinafter referred to as the Board, three
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1
appointed by the Corporation and three by the Union." "The Corporation
2
Members and Union Members shall serve without compensation as such."
Disputes which arise between the dompany appointed members and
the union appointed members are resolved by an impartial chairman who
may vote only in the case of a tie. "The Company and Union Members of
the Board shall appoint an Impartial Chairman who shall serve until
such time as he may be requested to resign by three members of the 
3
Board." Under each plan, the fees and expenses of the impartial 
chairman are shared equally by the firm and the union.
The Board of Administration under each of these plans has the 
following powers and responsibilities;
1. To establish the age and credited service of employees 
applying for benefits.
2. To grant hearings to those employees who contest de­
cisions of the Board.
3. To determine the pension amount of an applicant and to 
authorize the trustee to pay such an amount from the 
pension fund.
4. To receive an annual report from the trustees of 
pension fund receipts, disbursements, and assets, and 
a report from the actuary assessing the plan's actu­
arial condition.
5. To provide appropriate information explaining the plan 
to the company and to the union.
•^Supplemental Agreement Between General Motors Corporation and 
the UAW-AFL-CIO (Pension Plan), October 5, 1964, Section 3(a)(1).
2
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Chrysler Corporation 
and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Exhibit A, The Pension 
Plan, Sept. 22, 1964, Section 18(a).
^Ford Motor Company and International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Agreement 
Concerning Retirement Plan, Nov. 23, 1964, Article VII, Section 1.
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In all of the automobile industry plans, decisions of the Board 
are final and binding on all parties. The General Motors plan ex­
plicitly states that no matter respecting the pension plan shall be
4
subject to the regular grievance procedure.
In summary, pension plans in the automobile industry are jointly 
administered with disputes settled by a mutually selected impartial 
chairman.
B. Administration in the Steel Industry
Like the automobile industry, pension plans in the steel industry 
follow a definite pattern. Unlike the automobile industry, however, 
plans in this industry are administered exclusively by the firm. 
Specifically, the firm has the right to initiate action concerning a 
pension applicant while the union has the right to challenge. The 
plan of Inland Steel Company is quoted because of its succintness on 
this point. Quoted in its entirety, Section IV of that document reads: 
"This Plan shall be administered by the Company."'’ Jones and Laughlin’s 
plan is a little more explicit, providing for a Pension Board.
Bethlehem has the same arrangement, but, in each case, the Board is 
appointed by the firm.
Unlike the automobile manufacturers, the steel firms make no 
attempt to set forth the duties of the administrative boards except 
in the broadest of terms. The Jones and Laughlin plan gives the
^General Motors Plan, Sect. 3(f).
^Pension Agreement Between Inland Steel Company and United 
Steelworkers of America, July 1, 1962, Section IV.
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Board the power: "to make and enforce such regulations as shall be
6
necessary or proper for the efficient administration of this plan."
Whenever a dispute arises with respect to eligibility and the
pension amount, a special two-step grievance procedure is established.
If any difference shall arise between the Company and 
any employee who shall be an applicant for a pension as 
to such employee's right to a pension or the amount of 
his pension and agreement cannot be reached between the 
Company and a representative of the International Union, 
such question shall be referred to an impartial umpire 
to be selected by the Company and by the Union.7
The decision of the impartial umpire is final and binding under
all of these plans.
C. Administration in the Rubber Indus try
Plan administration in the rubber industry coincides closely with 
practices in the steel industry. The Firestone plan contains a pro­
vision which is representative of the industry. "The plan shall be 
administered by a Pension Board to be appointed by the Employer. The 
Board shall have such authority and perform such duties, consistent 
with this Pension Plan, as may be determined from'time to time by the 
Employer.
Unlike the steel industry, disputes are settled by resort to the 
regular "grievance provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
£
Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, General Noncontributory 
Pension Plan, Sept. 1, 1962, Sect. IV(a)(c).
^Pension Agreement Between Bethlehem Steel Company and United 
Steelworkers of America, April 6, 1962, Section V (1).
O
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Pension and Insurance Plan 
for Hourly-Rated Employees, as amended August 1, 1964, Article III.
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9
then in effect between the Company and the Union...," As is customary, 
the final step in the grievance procedure is arbitration, and the de­
cision of the arbitrator is final and binding.
D. Administration in the Petroleum Refining Industry 
In each of the industries thus far considered, a marked similarity 
has been noted among firms in the same industry. The petroleum refin­
ing industry departs somewhat from this practice. In fact, considerable 
intra-industry disparity is to be found.
Some of this intra-industry variety is probably attributable to 
the fact that most pension plans in this industry are quite old and 
were therefore developed before the age of ’'pattern" plans. The 
"youngest" plan included in this study is the Gulf plan which dates 
from 1944. The Humble plan was initiated in 1932. Although all of 
the plans have been substantially revised since their inception, 
certain of their characteristics are traceable to the original plans.
Another factor which has no doubt contributed to the variety is 
the fact that the petroleum refining industry has not been organized by 
a strong and centralized national union. The automobile, steel, and 
rubber industries, by contrast, have been organized since the 1930s and 
early 1940s by strong national unions which have tended to impose near­
identical conditions on all firms. Indeed, Walter Reuther or I. W.
Abel would find it difficult to explain significant intra-firm dif­
ferences to their constituents. The result has been a considerable
Q
United States Rubber Company and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum 
and Plastic Workers of America, Pension. Insurance and Severance Pay 
Agreement, August 1, 1964, Section D(i).
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amount of homogeneity among firms and the emergence of "automobile
pattern" and "steel pattern" pension plans.
The very lack of strong union pressure has led to a certain degree
of similarity between plans insofar as administration is concerned,
however. The Gulf Oil Corporation's plan is fairly representative.
That plan states:
Administration of the Plan, the exclusive power to interpret 
it, and the responsibility for carrying out its provisions 
are vested in an Annuity Committee of five members appointed 
by the Board of Directors.10
Rulings of the Company appointed Board are not subject to grie­
vance or appeal procedures. "The decisions of the Committee as to 
interpretation and application of the Plan shall be f i n a l . T h e  
Sinclair plan simply states that, "The Company's determination.,, in
connection with the interpretation or application of the Plan shall be 
12conclusive." The Humble plan allows a participant to present a con­
trary claim to the Company appointed Benefit Plan Committee (the same 
Committee that made the initial ruling), but: "Upon receiving such a 
claim the Committee shall decide whether it is true or not, and its
Gulf Oil Corporation, Annuities and Benefits Plan, August, 
1964, Sect. 7(1). Gulf also has a contributory pension plan which 
is optional with the employee. A review of this plan indicates 
that benefits are almost wholly financed by employee contributions, 
which makes it a sort of modified savings plan. It was not, 
accordingly, included in this study.
^Gulf, Section 7(2).
■^Sinclair Oil Corporation, Employee Retirement Allowance Plan, 
January 1, 1965, Section 12.2.
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decision shall be conclusive for all persons relying on this Benefit 
Plan.”13
The Shell Oil Company departs somewhat from the administrative 
procedures outlined above, but achieves substantially the same result. 
The text of this plan states that, "The general administration of the 
Plan shall be vested in the Trustees."3^ Further, "... the Trustees 
shall have full power and authority to determine all matters arising 
in the administration, interpretation and application of the plan, and 
the determination of any such matter by the Trustees shall be conclu­
sive on all persons."'*'3 The trustees named in the Trust Agreement are 
all Shell officials.3*’
The following conclusions were reached concerning pension plan 
administration in the four industries. In the automobile industry, 
administration is by a joint board and disputes are settled by a 
mutually acceptable impartial umpire. In the steel industry, adminis­
trative decisions are made by the firm subject to challenge by the 
union. Disputes are ultimately settled by an ad hoc impartial umpire. 
In the rubber industry, plans are administered by the firm, but, like 
the steel industry, subject to challenge by the union. Disputes are 
ultimately settled by resort to the final two steps of the regular
33Humble Oil and Refining Company, Text of Humble Benefit Plan,
January 1, 1965, Section 12.2.
3^Shell Oil Company, Shell Pension Plan, November 30, 1960, 
Section 11.
3,3Ibid. , Article XIII.
1 Shell Oil Company, Shell Pension Plan Trust Agreement,
November 30, 1960.
96
grievance procedure as established by the collective bargaining agree­
ment. Arbitration is the final step in settling a grievance. In the 
petroleum refining industry, administration is by the firm or firm 
appointed trustees, whose decisions are ultimately final. The "appeal" 
provision in the Humble plan allows no more than a request to review.
Eligibility Requirements for Normal Retirement
All pension plans establish conditions under which an employee may 
become eligible for a retirement benefit. Specifically, for normal 
retirement benefits, a worker is generally required to have achieved a 
certain minimum age and to have accumulated some minimum number of 
years of credited service. Additionally, many plans currently allow 
for retirement under conditions other than "normal." These departures 
may be classified as early retirement, special retirement, and dis­
ability retirement. These forms of retirement have their own special 
eligibility requirements and will be treated separately. The purpose 
of this section is to outline normal retirement eligibility requirements 
as they currently appear in pension plans in the automobile, steel, 
rubber, and petroleum refining industries.
A. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Automobile Industry 
The normal retirement age for employees in the automobile industry 
is 65. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler all have identical eligi­
bility requirements which provide that an employee who "Shall have 
attained the age of 65, shall have completed 10 or more years of 
credited service... and shall cease active service, shall be entitled 
to receive a pension,"I?
^General Motors, Article II, Section 1(a)(1).
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Firms in the automobile industry have somewhat elaborate formulae for
computing years of credited service. Ford, for instance, provides that
18
credited service shall be computed as follows:
1. For service prior to Feb, 28, 1950: One year for each
year seniority credited as of Feb. 28, 1950.
2. For service subsequent to Feb. 28, 1950 and prior to
Jan. 1, 1958:
a. 1800 or more compensated hours - 1 year
b. 1300 - 1299 compensated hours - 3/4 year
c. 750 - 1299 compensated hours - 1/2 year
d. Less than 750 compensated hours- 0 year
3. For service since Jan. 1, 1958:
a. 1700 or more compensated hours - 1 year
b. A proportionate credit to the nearest one-tenth 
of a year in which the employee received pay for 
less than 1700 hours.
With slight changes in effective dates, both Chrysler and General 
Motors provide that for service prior to 1950, the employee shall be 
credited with one year of service for each year of seniority accumulated 
prior to 1950, provided that no service which occurred prior to being 
off the payroll for more than 2 years shall be counted. For service 
subsequent to 1950, these firms credit service on the same basis as 
Ford does for service since 1958, i.e., one year for 1700 or more com­
pensated hours and proportional fractions of one year for each year in 
which less than 1700 compensated hours were worked.
The following special provisions with respect to creditable 
service appears in one or more of the plans:
18
Ford, Article III, Sections 1, 2, and 3.
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1. Hours of premium pay shall be computed as straight time 
hours (Chrysler, Ford, GM).
2. Time absent due to an injury which is compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation shall be credited at a rate of 
40 hours per week (Chrysler, Ford, GM) .
3. Time spent on approved leave of absence while engaged 
in local or international union business shall be 
credited at a rate of 40 hours per week (Chrysler,
Ford).
4. Time spent in active military service during the Korean 
War period (until June 1, 1955) shall be credited 
(Ford, GM).
5. Time spent on active military service, but not ex­
ceeding four years, shall be credited (Chrysler,
Ford, GM).
6. Credited service shall be reinstated in full for an 
employee who breaks service should he be re-employed 
within 36 months (Chrysler, Ford, GM).
7. An employee who retired for reasons other than 
disability shall not accumulate additional service 
upon being re-employed (Ford, GM).
Briefly, then, normal retirement in the automobile industry is 
predicated upon the achievement of age 65 and the accumulation of 10 
years credited service, with some variation between firms insofar as 
the computation of credited service is concerned.
B. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Steel Industry
Typical of firms within the steel industry, the Republic Steel
Corporation plan states that: "An employee age 65 or over with 15
19years of continuous service may retire and receive a pension." The 
amount of creditable service within the steel industry uniformly means
19Republic Steel Corporation, Pension Plan of Republic Steel 
Corporation, January 1, I960, Eligibility.
99
"continuous service prior to retirement calculated from the employee's
20
last hiring date."
Continuous service is not deemed to have been broken by the fol­
lowing occurrances:
1. Discharge, provided the employee is re-hired within six 
months.
2. Layoff for a period not exceeding 2 years.
3. Absence from service due to a compensable disability.
4. Military service for a period not exceeding 4 years.
5. Re-employed retirees may accumulate additional credited 
service.
According to these requirement, an employee in the steel industry 
receives credited service for any year in which he is employed, re­
gardless of how many hours or days are actually worked. Effectively, 
credited service accumulates from a worker's date of hire provided 
continuity of service is not broken.
In computing credited service, it appears that the steel industry 
is more liberal than the automobile industry. The automobile industry, 
however, requires only 10 years service for normal retirement as com­
pared with the steel industry's 15-year requirement.
C. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Rubber Industry
Normal retirement requirements in the rubber industry coincide 
closely with requirements in the steel industry. Typical of this in­
dustry, B. F. Goodrich provides that: "An employee retiring on or 
after August 1, 1964, who shall have attained age sixty-five (65) and
^Jones and Laughlin, Section 3(1).
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who has not less than ten (10) years of Continuous Service Credit at
his normal retirement date, shall be entitled to receive a pension
21
upon retirement."
Credited service in the rubber industry means accumulated seni­
ority with the firm, which is computed in accordance with the regular
22
collective bargaining agreement. In general, then, years of credited
service is equal to the number of years employed, regardless of the
number of hours which might have been worked in any of these years. An
exception to this is that for the purpose of computing the pension
amount (but not for satisfying the 10-year requirement), service after
23
the attainment of age 65 may not be included. Also, up to two years 
of service may be credited for time spent on layoff or approved leave
4T V. 2 4of absence.
D. Normal Retirement Requirements in the Petroleum Refining 
Indus try
As previously indicated, there is no industry pattern in the 
petroleum refining industry. The considerable diversity is most ap­
parent in provisions dealing with normal retirement. Suffice it here, 
then, to set down some of the more salient features of several plans in 
the industry.
21B. F. Goodrich, Pension Plan, January 1, 1965, Article 2.1.
22Firestone, Article VIII (3).
23Ibid.
2^United States Rubber Co,., Section C(l).
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Gulf Oil Corporation sets the normal retirement age at 65, with no
minimum service requirement. Credited service does, however, play an
25
important role in determining the pension amount.
The Sinclair plan has a normal retirement age of 62 with no minimum
service requirement per se. A minimum of sorts is required, however,
by an eligibility clause which provides that participation in the plan
26
is available only to an employee with one or more years of service.
The Shell plan coincides with plans in the steel industry, with a
normal retirement age of 65 and a minimum service requirement of 15
27 28years. The same requirement is found in the Humble plan.
Insofar as computation of credited service is concerned, the 
petroleum refining industry has the usual continuous service require­
ments, with allowances for such contingencies as leaves of absence, 
military service, sickness, and disability. The Humble plan, though it 
requires 15 years service for normal retirement, fails to specify how 
this service is to be computed other than ambiguous statements to the 
effect that benefit plan service "means service credited by the-employer
for the purpose of this Benefit Plan," and credited service "means service
29credited by the employer.” In general, creditable service and seni­
ority are synonymous within the industry.
^~*Gulf, Section 1(12).
^Sinclair, Section 2.1.
^Shell, Sections l(m) and 3(a).
28Humble, Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
^Humble, "Glossary of Terms.
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Early, Special, and Disability Retirement
As previously indicated, most pension plans allow retirement under 
conditions other than "normal." Generally, these departures are 
designed to provide a pension benefit to a qualifying employee who 
either: (a) voluntarily retires before reaching the normal retirement 
age; (b) involuntarily breaks service or breaks service under mutually 
satisfactory conditions before reaching retirement age, or; (c) be­
comes permanently disabled. For the purpose of this exposition, 
retirement under these conditions will be referred to respectively as 
early retirement, special early retirement, and disability retirement. 
Collectively, they shall hereinafter be referred to as specialized 
retirement.
In order to avoid confusion with benefit computation under normal 
retirement provisions, the methods by which benefits are computed for 
specialized retirement are included along with the following discus­
sion of eligibility requirements. The benefits mentioned are payable 
to employees who retire after September, 1964. An employee who retired 
before this date would get a somewhat smaller benefit under some of the 
plans. (A revision of the Social Security program became effective on 
September 1, 1964).
A. Specialized Retirement in the Automobile Indus try 
Within the automobile industry, provisions dealing with specialized 
forms of retirement are identical among the several firms. As a matter 
of convenience and to eliminate needless repetition, the plan of Ford 
Motor Company was chosen to illustrate the nature of specialized retire­
ment provisions within the industry.
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Early retirement is available to an automobile worker upon the
satisfaction of either of two requirements: (a) the attainment of 60
years of age and 10 or more years of credited service, or; (b) the
attainment of 55 years of age or over but less than 60, if age and
30
credited service total at lea'st 85. Fulfillment of either of these
requirements entitles an employee to a regular early retirement benefit
each month, "in an amount equal to $4.25 for each year of his credited
service at retirement multiplied by the percentage applicable with
31










62 or over 100.0
An employee who is discharged for cause and who has fulfilled 
either of the above age and service requirements is considered to have 
retired under this provision. As will be discussed later, a voluntary 
early retiree is eligible for a "supplemented" pension considerably 
larger than the amount available under this formula. As a practical 
matter, this formula would be used only by an employee who was dis­
charged for cause.
30
Ford, Article IV (2)(a).
^Ford, Article V (2) (b) .
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Special early retirement is available to an employee who is rer
tired at the option of the company or under mutually satisfactory
conditions. In view of the liberal benefits provided a retiree, this
type retirement appears to be designed to enable the firm to terminate
the employment of an individual whose continued employment has for some
reason become undesirable.
A worker may be placed in special early retirement if he is over
55 but less than 65 years of age and has 10 or more years of credited
service. The monthly benefit payable to such a retiree is:
...in an amount equal to $4.25 for each year of his 
credited service at retirement and, a temporary benefit 
commencing at early retirement in an amount equal to 
$5.20 for each year of his credited service at retire­
ment (not to exceed a total of $130.00); provided, 
however, that for any month after the retired employee 
attains age 65 or becomes eligible for an unreduced 
Social Security benefit the temporary benefit shall 
not be payable.
Disability retirement is available to an automobile worker if he 
is adjudged by the pension board to be permanently and totally disabled 
and is at least 50 years of age and has credited service of at least 
10 years. The benefit to which such a retiree is eligible is exactly
the same as that payable to a special early retiree of equal age and
. 33
service.
■^Ford, Article V (2)(d).
33Disability benefits are generally denied to an individual in 
the automobile and other industries if the disability is the result 
of: (a) injury incurred while engaged in a criminal enterprise;
(b) habitual drunkenness or narcotic addiction; (c) an intentionally 
self-inflicted injury; (d) injury or disease resulting from service 
in the armed forces. The retiree may also be required to submit to 
a medical examination from time to time.
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The latest automobile industry plans provide a special supplemental 
allowance to employees who retire under the specialized forms of retire­
ment subsequent to September 1, 1965. (An employee who is retired 
through discharge for cause is not eligible for this supplemental 
allowance). The Ford plan provides a supplemental allowance that shall 
be:
If the employee shall have reached his 60th birthday on 
the date of his retirement, an amount which when added to 
his monthly retirement benefit... shall equal: $400 
reduced by an amount equal to 66 2/3 cents multiplied by 
the number of twentieths of a year that his credited 
service at retirement is less than 30 years. ^
The drafters of this provision must be accorded recognition as 
masters of the art of abstruse expression'. Translated, it means that 
the monthly pension of an early retiree who is at least 60 years old 
will be $400 reduced by $1.11 for each month that his service at re­
tirement is less than 30 years. A man with 29 years service would thus 
have his supplemented pension reduced by $13.33 (12 x $1.11), or, from 
$400 to $386.67.
If a retiree is less than 60, the method by which his benefit is
computed is even more involved. First of all, the basic $400 must be
reduced in accordance with the above formula if the worker's service is
less than 30 years. The resulting sum is then multiplied by:
a fraction the numerator of which is 60 and the denominator
of which is the number of months from his retirement date 
to and including the month in which he would attain age 65.
34
Ford, Article VI (2)(a).
■^Ford, Article VI (2) (b) .
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For a worker who is 55 years of age, this final adjustment reduces
the pension by one-half. (Sum x 60/120).
Using the formulae outlined above, the supplemented pension of a
worker age 55 who elected to retire after 25 years of service would be 
36
$166.67. ($400.- 60 ($1.11) = $333.34, which is further reduced by
the age factor, $333.34 (60/120) = $166.67). Without the supplement, 
the same retiree's pension would have been $61.52. ($4.25 x 25 x .579).
The supplement therefore amounts to $105.15 in this case.
Payment of the supplemental allowance is subject to a number of 
conditions:
1. It ceases when the retiree becomes eligible for an 
unreduced Social Security benefit.
2. A retiree cannot earn in excess of $1,200 in any 
calendar year.
3. A retiree's supplemented pension cannot exceed 70% 
of his final monthly base pay (173 1/3 x base 
hourly rate at retirement).
4. An employee discharged for cause is not eligible for 
the supplemental allowance.
The supplemental allowance is designed primarily for workers who 
accept regular early retirement. A special early retiree or a disa­
bility retiree who was 55 years of age and had 25 years of service 
would get a pension of $236.25 ($4.25 (25) plus $5.20 (25) = $236.25), 
and since his pension would therefore exceed the minimum established by 
the supplement, no supplement would be payable. It could, however, 
result in a substantial benefit to a retiree, whether regular early,
36These figures are chosen for purposes of illustration only.
In actual fact, a worker age 55 with only 25 years of service would 
not be eligible for regular early retirement.
107
special early, or disability, who was between the age of 60 and 65 and 
who had service of 30 or more years. In such a case, the supplemental 
allowance would guarantee a $400 monthly benefit, assuming that $400 
was less than 70% of his final base pay. A disability or special early 
retiree would otherwise receive an unsupplemented benefit of $257.50.
B. Specialized Retirement in the Steel Indus try
Provisions dealing with specialized forms of retirement in the 
steel industry are, as in the automobile industry, highly standardized. 
The plan of Inland Steel Company was chosen as typical of the industry. 
Terminology in the plans differ, but the results under all of them are 
the s ame.
A steel worker may elect early retirement after 15 years of
service and the attainment of 60 years of age. Fulfillment of these
requirements qualify a worker to receive a special payment equal to 13
37weeks vacation pay and a lifetime monthly pension. An early retiree 
is entitled to a benefit equal to one percent of his average monthly 
earnings during the last 10 years of service multiplied by the number 
of years of credited service, or, a monthly benefit equal to $2.60 for 
each year of service after January 1, I960 plus $2.50 for each year of 
service prior to January 1, 1960, whichever is greater. As indicated 
in Chapter III, this latter method of computation is designed to 
protect the long-service low-wage employee.
37Collective bargaining agreements in the steel industry 
provide that workers in the upper half of the seniority roster 
are entitled to a 13-week vacation every fifth year. A retiree 
is entitled to a lump sum payment equal to 13 weeks vacation 
pay irrespective of his seniority ranking. See U. S. Steel 
Corporation, Saying and Vacation Plan, 1962, Section 3.0.
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Whichever method is used, the resulting sum is reduced on an 
actuarial basis to compensate for retirement before age 65. The amount 
of reduction is based on tables "adopted from time to time by the
O Q
Company." The Bethlehem plan contains the following table:







This actuarial reduction may be avoided by deferring receipt of 
the monthly benefit until the age of 65.
The steel industry plans do not contain the temporary benefits 
(payable until age 65) provided by the automobile industry. The 13- 
week vacation payment might be regarded as a partial offset to this, 
however.
A worker may be placed on special early retirement in the steel 
industry for any of the following reasons: (a) the shutdown of a plant 
or department; (b) layoff, when return to employment is deemed un­
likely; (c) disability (the disability not being sufficient to qualify
39as total and permanent); (d) under mutually satisfactory conditions.
The benefit of a special early retiree is computed by the same 
method used for regular early retirement. Eligibility requirements, 
however, differ. In order to qualify for special early retirement, a
"^Inland, Section II (4) (b) . 
Inland, Section I (4).
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worker must either: (a) have attained a minimum age of 55 and have
minimum service of 15 years and whose age and service total 75 or more,
40
or (b) have combined age and service which totals at least 80.
A disability pension is available to steel workers provided they
have a minimum of 15 years service, regardless of age. The disability
retirement benefit is the greater of $100 or an amount computed by use
of the same service-times-earnings formula mentioned in connection with
regular early retirement. A worker placed on disability retirement is
41
also entitled to the special 13-week vacation payment.
C. Specialized Retirement in the Rubber Indus try
A worker in the rubber industry is eligible for regular early
retirement upon the attainment of 55 years of age and the accumulation
42of 15 years of credited service. An employee who retires under this
provision may choose either: (a) an immediate monthly benefit equal to
$3.25 multiplied by years of service, reduced by 4/10 of one percent
for each month by which he is less than 62 at retirement, or (b) an
unreduced amount, deferred until age 62, equal to $3.25 multiplied by
43years of service. Under this scheme, a worker who retired at age 55 




^Inland, Section II (2) .
^Firestone, Article IV, Section 2(a) 
^ U .  S. Rubber, Section B(2)(a).
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The rubber industry has secondary early retirement provisions
(referred to in industry plans as "special early retirement," but these
provisions do not provide for special early retirement in the sense
that the term has been used in this study) which allow an employee to
retire at age 62 with a minimum of 10 years service. The monthly
benefit payable to an employee under this arrangement is determined by
44
multiplying years of service by $3.25.
A rubber worker may be placed on special early retirement (in the
sense that the term has been previously used) at the option of the
employer or under mutually satisfactory conditions upon the completion
of 15 years service and the attainment of age 55. The monthly benefit
of such a retiree is computed by multiplying years of service by $6.50.
No reduction is made for age. A special early retiree would thus
receive a benefit more than twice that of a regular early retiree of
equal age and service. Upon becoming eligible for an unreduced Social
Security benefit, the retired employee is entitled to a benefit equal
45to $3.25 multiplied by years of service.
Disability retirement in the rubber industry is conditioned upon 
the completion of at least 10 years of service. The employee's age at 
the onset of such disability is immaterial. The benefit amount is 
computed by the same formula used for special early retirement, and is 
also reduced when the employee becomes eligible for an unreduced Social
44B. F. Goodrich, Article 3.2.
^Firestone, Article V (2) (c) .
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Security benefit. Unlike the special early retiree, however, a minimum
46monthly benefit of $100 is guaranteed to the disability retiree.
D. Specialized Retirement in the Petroleum Refining Indus try 
As with other plan provisions, there is considerable diversity 
among petroleum refining firms insofar as specialized retirement pro­
visions are concerned. None of the firms which were chosen for study 
provide for special early retirement. Specialized retirement within 
the industry is therefore confined to early retirement and disability 
retirement.
The Gulf Oil Corporation provides that an employee may retire 
early if he has reached a minimum age of 50 and his age plus service 
equals 75 or more. The wording of the early retirement provision of 
this Company is interesting. An employee who has established eligibil­
ity "...shall be retired early...after he or any of the Gulf Companies
47
files a written application with the Committee." Evidently, a worker
could be placed on early retirement at the request of the firm whether
or not the employee desired such retirement.
The early retirement benefit of a Gulf employee who defers
receipt of monthly payments until age 65 is equal to 3/4 of 1% of each
year's compensation not over the Social Security ceiling, plus 1^ 7, of
each year's compensation over such ceiling. If the retiree chooses an
immediate early annuity, it is equal to the deferred annuity, computed
48
as above, multiplied by the following percentages:
^Firestone, Article V (3).
^Gulf, Section 4(B). (Italics furnished).
^Gulf, Section V (b) .
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Age Percentage Age Percentage
50 33 58 65
51 36 59 70
52 39 60 75
53 42 61 80
54 45 62 85
55 ' 50 63 90
56 55 64 95
57 60
Disability retirement is available to a Gulf employee after a
minimum of 15 years of service, without regard to age. The amount of
such a benefit is computed in the same way as the early retirement
49benefit, but without reduction for age.
The pension plan of Shell Oil Company provides for two types of 
early retirement. If a worker is 50 years of age or above and the sum 
of his age and service is 80 or more, he may retire at his own option. 
Alternatively, if the employee is at least 50 years of age and has at 
least 20 years of service, he may be involuntarily retired at the 
option of the company. In either case, the employee may choose either 
an immediate annuity or defer receipt of the benefit until age 65.
The amount of the benefit in either case is computed by using the 
normal retirement benefit formula of 0.8% of final compensation*^ up 
to the Social Security tax base times years of service, plus 1.2% of 
final compensation over the Social Security base times years of 
service. Should the early retiree chose to receive an immediate
^Gulf, Section V (c) .
50Final compensation means the average monthly compensation 
of an employee during his five consecutive years of highest earnings 
during his last ten years of service. Shell, Section 1(L).‘
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pension, the monthly benefit is reduced in amount by the same percent­
ages mentioned in connection with the Gulf plan, above. ^
A Shell employee may be placed on disability retirement after 15 
or more years of service, regardless of age. The benefit of such a 
retiree would be the greater of: (a) 257o of final compensation, or;
(b) in the case of an employee who is eligible for an early pension,
52
the unreduced amount of such early pension.
The retirement plan of Sinclair Oil Corporation is contributory
and somewhat more liberal in benefits and eligibility requirements
than either the Gulf or Shell plans.
A Sinclair employee is eligible for early retirement upon the
attainment of age 55, without regard to years of service. (Normal
retirement age is 62). The pension of an early retiree is found by
taking 1.5% of monthly compensation up to the Social Security tax base
plus 2% of monthly compensation above that base and multiplying the
53
result by years of service. The benefit under this plan is not based
on the usual "highest five years' earnings." Data on earnings from
the date of hire are required to compute the benefit.






"^Sinclair, Appendix B, Table I.
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An employee with at least 15 years of service and who has attained
age 50 or more is entitled to an unreduced normal annuity in case of
disability. A disabled worker under age 50 receives a normal annuity
reduced by 5% for each year that he is less than 50.
An Humble Oil and Refining Company employee with 15 years of
55
service may retire as early as age 55. In discussing this Company's
specialized retirement system, it will be necessary to restate some of
the plan language to facilitate meaningful comparisons between it and
other plans. The difficulty arises from the fact that Humble includes
part of a worker's Social Security benefit in what it refers to as
3 6
"annuity from company sources." It is thus clear that "annuity from 
company sources" is greater than and not comparable to retirement income 
payable from the private pension fund. In effect, in order to arrive 
at the private pension benefit, an offset equal to as much as % of 
Social Security benefits must be deducted from "annuity from company
"^Humble, Section 8.2 (2) (b) .
C £
Some of the terminology and information concerning early 
and disability retirement was taken from a collection of examples 
of "How to Estimate Your Monthly Retirement Income" which Humble 
distributed to employees in 1966.
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sources." This applies to normal retirement as well as to early and
disability retirement.
Computation of early retirement benefits under the Humble plan is
somewhat involved. First of all, it is necessary to compute what is
referred to as the "discounted annuity from company sources." This is
arrived at by thp following method: (a) multiply 1 .6% by years of
service; (b) multiply the resulting percentage figure by final monthly
pay (average of highest five of last ten years); (c) multiply the re-
57suiting dollar amount by the following percentage figures:
Age Percent Age Percent
64 97 59 78
63 94 58 71
62 91 57 64
61 8 8 56 57
60 85 55 50
If the worker is at least 62, but not yet 65, one-half of the 
Social Security benefit to which he is then entitled must be deducted 
from this "discounted annuity from company sources" to arrive at the 
amount payable from the private plan.
Further computation is necessary if the retiree is less than age 
62. This computation involves: (a) multiplying years of service (up 
to a maximum of 33 1/3 years) by 3%; (b) multiplying the resulting 
percentage by % the Social Security benefit to which the employee will 
be entitled at age 62. The resulting dollar amount is then deducted 
from the "discounted annuity from company sources" mentioned above.
To this sub-total is then added a flat $100 Pre-Social Security Annuity.
■^Humble, Section 8.2 (2)(b).
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Some appropriate remarks concerning the general nature of benefit 
computation under the Humble plan seem to be in order. First of all, 
the company has gone to considerable pain to include, indirectly, part 
of the OASDI benefit in its "annuity from company sources." Since 
these benefits obviously are not payable from the private plan but 
from a completely independent public plan, there is little reason for 
interweaving the two. Yet, the basic Humble formula (1.6% x Service 
x Final Pay) yields an amount which includes part of the OASDI benefit. 
The result is that, for long service employees, the plan includes a 
full 50% OASDI offset, concealed though it may be. Proof of this fact 
is that an increase in OASDI benefits would result in a reduction in 
payment from the private fund equal to 50% of"such an increase.
Beyond this, the benefit formula for a pre-62 early retiree seems 
unduly complicated, and in one respect at least, more than a little 
baffling. For such a retiree with 15 years of service, for instance, 
45% (3% x Service) of one-half of the OASDI benefit must be deducted 
from the amount of his discounted annuity and $ 1 0 0 added to the-rer 
suiting amount in order to arrive at his monthly benefit. The writer 
hereby confesses ignorance of the logic behind this arrangement. Of 
course, 3% times 33 1/3 equals 100%., but then so does an infinite 
number of other possible combinations. The fact that this arrangement 
provides a reduced OASDI offset for the short-service employee is plain 
enough, but the method by which the magical 3%, was arrived at cannot be 
fathomed. The difficulty springs from the intermingling of public and 
private benefits. The firm might do well to divorce its plan from 
OASDI and then, if it wishes, stress the fact that OASDI benefits are 
partially financed by the company through OASDI taxes.
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Disability retirement is provided to an employee with at least 15
years of service, regardless of age. Such an employee is entitled to
the greater of an amount equal to his undiscounted annuity (1 .6% x
Service x final pay) or a percent of his normal compensation. The per-
58
cent of normal compensation is based on the following table:
Service Percent of Normal Compensation
15 years, and 37%% and increasing by %
increasing by 1 percent for each additional
through a maximum year of service up to a
of 40 years maximum of 50%
The criticism voiced earlier notwithstanding, the specialized 
pension amounts provided by Humble, even after allowing for the OASDI 
offset, are quite liberal when compared with other firms in and outside 
its industry. Within the petroleum refining industry, its nearest 
competitor is Sinclair, which has, as indicated earlier, a contributory 
plan. The firm prides itself in being a "pioneer" and "leader" in 
providing retirement benefits. The plan has been frequently amended, 
sometimes at intervals as short as six months, in order to maintain 
this position.
Perhaps the best method of comparing specialized retirement 
benefits would be to assume various age, service, and compensation 
levels and see what benefits would be payable under each of the plans 
discussed. The results of such a computation appears in Table IV-1. 
This table clearly reflects those factors which enter into computation 
of benefits; i.e., age, service, earnings, social security base and
58Humble Oil and Refining Company, Highlights of the Employee 
Benefit Program, "Disability Annuity Plan", January 1, 1966.























2 0 0 . 0 0 266.80 280.00 2 0 0 . 0 0 266.80 385.00
■n —  ■ 
2 0 0 . 0 0 266.80 400.00,
Special or Disability 257.50 ‘ 189.00 280.00 257.50 189.00 385.00 257.50 189.00 400.00
Steel (all) 









1 0 0 . 0 0 94.062 191.44
Rubber (all) 
Early 64.74 58.56 113.75' 64.74 58.56 113.75 64.74 58.56 113.75










Disability 90.00 60.00 105.00 123.75 82.50 144.38 191.25 127.50 223.13
Shell 
' Early 48.00 48.00 95.20 6 6 . 0 0 6 6 . 0 0 130.90 93.00 93.00 184.45
Disability 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 2 . 0 0 137.50 137.50 154.00 175.00 175.00 217.00
Sinclair
"" Early 90.00 100.80 2 1 0 . 0 0 123.75 138.50 288.75 168.75 189.00 393.75
Disability 180.00 1 2 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 247.50 165.00 288.75 337.50 225.00 393.75
Table IV-1. Continued.
INDUSTRY OR FIRM: 
Petroleum Refining



























Disability 180.00 160.00 190.00 247.50 2 2 0 . 0 0 250.25 315.00 280.00 332.50
None of the steel industry plans contain tables by which the pension of a retiree 
less than age 60 can be computed. A minimum disability benefit of $100 is guaranteed. 
2Minimum disability benefit is $100.
^Social Security base is assumed to be $6,600.
^The amount of Social Security benefits payable at age 62 is assumed to be the maximum 
payable for each income range,
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benefits, and eligibility requirements. Some of the plans omit one or 
more of these factors altogether. In some, one factor, such as age, is 
given considerable weight, while in others, service may be the most im­
portant consideration.
In the automobile industry, earnings do not enter into the 
benefit formula except that the pension amount cannot exceed 70% of 
pre-retirement earnings. For an automobile worker, age at retire­
ment is the most important consideration, with service a distant 
second.
In the steel industry, earnings and service are strategic, 
with substantial reduction for the age factor if retirement occurs 
several years short of age 65.
For a rubber worker, earnings and service are paramount, with 
relatively minor consideration given to age.
Gulf Oil Corporation's plan emphasizes age, service, and 
earnings, with earnings achieving increased weight once the OASDI 
tax base is exceeded. The same is true of the Shell plan, although 
earnings in excess of the OASDI base are somewhat less important.
The Sinclair plan is quite similar, although earnings means average 
lifetime earnings instead of the usual "final pay" earnings. The 
Humble plan gives weight to each age, service, earnings, and social 
security benefits. Of these, service and final pay appear to be of 
primary importance.
The factors which enter into benefit computation in each of 
these industries and firms are summarized in Table IV-2.
Table IV-2. Specialized Retirement Benefit Formulae.
Eligibility Disability and
Indus try Eligibility Regular Early for Special Early
or Requirements for Retirement Disability Retirement




(a) Age 60 and 10 
years' service, 
or;
(b) Age 55 but less 




Age 55 and 10 years' 
service with con­
sent of the firm 
or at the option 
of the firm
$4.25 x Service x Percentage re­
duction based on age, plus a 
supplement which when added to 
this benefit shall equal $400, 
reduced: (a) by $1. 1 1 for each 
month that service is less than 
30 years, and, if age is less 
than 60, further reduced by;
(b) multiplying the resulting 
sum by a fraction, the numer­
ator of which is 60 and the 
denominator of which is the 
number of months that age is 
less than 65. The resulting 
benefit to be further reduced 
if it is more than 70% of
50 years of age 
and 10 years' 
service
The greater of:
(a) an amount equal 
to $4.25 for each 
year of service plus 
$5.20 for each year 
of service (up to 
$130.00), or; (b) an 
amount computed by 
use of the Regular 
Early benefit form­
ula .
Steel 2 Regular Early: The greater of: 15 years' Regular Early benefit
Industry Age 60 and 15 years' (a) 1% of monthly earnings x service formula, with minimum
service service, or; of $ 1 0 0 monthly
Special Early: (b) $2.60 for each years' ser­ benefit for disability
(a) Age 55 and 15 vice after Jan. 1, 1960
years' service, plus $2..50 for each years'
providing that service before Jan. 1, I960.
age plus ser­ Actuarially reduced by a per­
vice totals 75, centage based on age at retire­
or; ment.
(b) age plus ser­
vice totals 80





















(a) Age 55 and 15 
years' service, 
or;
(b) Age 62 and 10 
years 1 service
Special Early:
Age 55 and 15 years' 
service with con­
sent of the firm or 
at the option of the 
firm
$3.25 x Service, reduced by 
4/10 of 1% for each month that 




$6.50 x Service un­
reduced for age, with 
$ 1 0 0 minimum for 
disability
Gulf Age 50, providing 
age plus service 
totals 75 or more.
3/4 of 17o of annual'* compensa­
tion not over the Social 
Security tax base, plus 1.5% 
of annual compensation in 
excess of such base, with the 
resulting amount actuarially 
reduced by a percentage based 




with Regular Early 
benefit formula, but 
unreduced for age.
Shell At employee's 
Option: 50 years of 
age, providing age 
plus service totals 
80 or more 
At Employer's Op­
tion:
Age 50 and 20 years'
0 .8% of compensation not over 
Social Security base x service, 
plus 1 .2% of compensation in 
excess of Social Security base 
x service, reduced by a per­
centage based on age at 
retirement
15 years 1 
service
Disability: The 
greater of: (a) 25% 
of final compensation, 
or; (b) the unreduced 
amount of such pension 
if eligible for an 
early pension


















Humble Age 55 and 15
years 1 service
If age 62 or over:
1 ,6% x service x compensation 
x percentage reduction for age, 
minus 1/2 of Social Security 
benefit to which entitled.
If less than age 62:
1 .6% x service x compensation 
x percentage reduction for 
age, from which amount is 
DEDUCTED a sum equal to Service 
x 37» x 1/2 of Social Security 
benefit to which the employee 
will be entitled at age 62, to 





(a) Early retirement 
benefit to which 
entitled, unreduced 
for age, or;
(b) a percentage of 
normal compensation 






maximum by ^% for
of 40 each addi-
years tional
year to a 
maximum of 
50%
Table IV-2. Continued £4)
Eligibility Disability and
Indus try Eligibility Regular Early for Special Early
or Requirements for Retirement Disability Retirement
Firm Early Retirement Benefit Formula Benefit Benefit Formula
Sinclair Age 55 without 1,5% of monthly compensation up 15 years 1 Disability:
regard to to Social Security base x ser­ service Unreduced early re­
service vice, plus 2 .0% of monthly 
compensation in excess of Social 
Security base times service, re­
duced by a percentage based on 
age at retirement
tirement benefit if 
more than 50 years of 
age, reduced by 5% 
for each year that 
age at retirement is 
less than 50,
All of these plans provide that the pension amount shall be computed in accordance with the normal 
retirement formula upon becoming eligible for unreduced Social Security benefits.
steel industry employee is. also eligible for a one-time payment equal to 13 weeks vacation pay 
upon retirement...
The resulting sum must be divided by 12 to arrive at the monthly benefit.
^To a maximum of 33 1/3 years' service.
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Normal Retirement Benefits
Normal retirement benefits are ordinarily computed with the same
formula that is used for specialized retirement, except, of course,
that no adjustment is made for the age factor.
In the automobile industry, the monthly benefit of an employee who
retires after January 1, 1965 is $4.25 multiplied by years of service.
The supplemental allowance mentioned in connection with specialized
retirement is not available to an employee who retires under the
59
normal retirement provision.
In the steel industry, an employee who is placed on normal re­
tirement is entitled to the greater of: (a) a monthly amount equal 
to 1% of final compensation multiplied by years of service, or; (b) 
a monthly amount caluculated by multiplying years of service before 
January 1, 1960 by $2.50 and years of service after January 1, 1960 
by $2.60. If the benefit is computed by use of the first formula, it 
is subject to an $80 OASDI offset. If the second formula is used, no 
offset is made.^ The first four benefit amounts shown for the steel 
industry in Table IV-3 were computed with the flat dollar amount 
formula, which yields the greatest benefit for the short service 
and/or low wage employee.
In the rubber industry, the normal pension amount is computed by
61.
multiplying $3.25 by years of service.
cq
General Motors, Article 2, Section l(b)(4)(ii).
60Jones and Laughlin, Section II, 3(a) or 3(b).
^U .  S. Rubber Company, Section B (1).
Table IV-3, Normal Retirement Benefits.
Final Monthly Pay - $400 Final Monthly Pay
1




















Automobile (all firms) 85.00 127.50 170.00 85.00 127.50 170.00 85.00 127.50 170.00
Steel (all firms) 50.50 75.50 100.50 50.50 85.00 140.00 60.00 130.00 2 0 0 . 0 0
Rubber (all firms) 65.00 97.50 130.00 65.00 97.50 130.00 65.00 97.50 130.00
1
Gulf Oil Corp. 60.00 90.00 1 2 0 . 0 0 82.50 123.75 165.00 127.50 191.25 255.00
Shell Oil Co. 64.00 96.00 128.00 8 8 . 0 0 132.00 1 7 6 . 0 0 124.00 186.00 248.00
2,3
Sinclair Oil Co. 1 2 0 . 0 0 180.00 240.00 165.00 247.50 330.00 225.00 337.50 450.00
4
Humble Oil Co. 60.05 124.05 188.05 92.00 180.00 268.00 1 2 0 . 0 0 2 2 2 , 0 0 324.00
The OASDI tax base is assumed |o be $6,600 per year or $550 per month.
The pension amounts shown are based on the assumption that the monthly pay used in the compensation
is average lifetime earnings. For other industries and firms, the monthly pay means the average
monthly compensation during the five years of highest earnings during the last ten years of service. 
■^Normal retirement age is 62 years for this firm.
^The pension amounts shown are the amounts payable from the private pension fund. OASDI benefits
included in this firm's "income from company sources" have been deducted.
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As previously noted, there is considerable variation among firms 
within the petroleum refining industry. Normal retirement benefit 
formulae for the four firms included in this study may be summarized as 
follows, however:
Gulf - - - - -  3 / 4 of 1% of each year's compensation not over 
the Social Security tax base, plus 1.5% of each 
year's compensation over such base.
Shell- - - - - 0.8% of final compensation not over the Social 
Security base times years of service, plus 
1 .2% of final compensation in excess of such 
base times years of service.
Sinclair - - - 1,5% of monthly compensation up to the Social 
Security base times years of service, plus 2% 
of monthly compensation in excess of the Social 
Security base times years of service.
Humble - - - - 1.6% times service times final compensation 
minus 1/2 of the Social Security benefit to 
which entitled.
Table IV-3 reflects normal retirement benefits which would be pay­
able under these plans for various service and compensation combinations. 
It will be noted that in the case of the automobile and rubber in­
dustries, the pension amount is independent of earnings and advances 
only with service. In all other cases, the pension amount advances 
with both earnings and service. In the case of the Gulf, Shell, and 
Sinclair oil companies, earnings are particularly important once the 
Social Security tax base ($550 per month) is exceeded. Sinclair 
provides the highest benefits for all earnings - service combinations. 
This is no doubt attributable to the fact that the plan is contribu­
tory and therefore financed by both the firm and the employee. The 
employee contributes 2.4% of his earnings on earnings up to the 
Social Security tax base and 3.2% of his earnings on earnings which
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exceed that base. An employee earning $700 per month would therefore 
contribute $18.00 per month.
Survivor and Pre-Retirement Death Benefits
It is common practice to allow a retiring employee to accept a 
reduced monthly benefit during his lifetime so that his surviving 
dependent(s) might continue to receive a pension after his death. The 
amount by which the employee's lifetime benefit is reduced generally 
depends upon his age at retirement and the age of his designated bene­
ficiary. Survivor benefits are always optional with the employee and 
the option must ordinarily be exercised before benefit payments 
commence. A few plans allow a retiree to exercise the option after 
benefits have begun upon presentation of acceptable evidence of good 
health. Some plans require that the designated beneficiary be the 
employee's spouse, while other require only that the beneficiary have 
an insurable interest in the employee.
In addition to survivor benefits, which provide income to the 
survivor of an employee who had already retired, some plans provide 
benefits to survivors of long-service employees who die before
retirement. It was estimated in 1965 that 28% of all pension plans
63
provide some form of benefits to survivors of active employees.
62Sinclair, Section 5.1.
^Bankers Trust Company, 1965 Study of Industrial Retirement 
Plans, Bankers Trust Company, New York, 1965, p. 21.
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A . Survivor and Fre-Retirement Death Benefits in the Automobile 
Indus try
An automobile worker may opt for a survivor's benefit at any time
before commencement of pension payments. This option is available to
an employee regardless of the nature of his retirement, i.e., normal,
early, special early, deferred, or disability. The designated
beneficiary must be the employee's spouse and the couple must have been
64
married for at least one year at the time the option is exercised.
The pension amount of a retired employee who exercises the sur­
vivor's option shall be the monthly benefit to which he is otherwise 
entitled (excluding any supplemental allowance) multiplied by 90% if 
the employee's age and his spouse's age are the same. This basic 
90% is increased by %^, for each year that the spouse's age exceeds 
the employee's age (to a maximum of 1 0 0%,) and decreased by %% for each 
year that the spouse's age is less than the employee's age. For an 
employee whose spouse is 10 years his junior, the pension payable 
during his lifetime would thus be 85% of the amount to which he would 
be entitled had the option not been exercised. At the death of the 
pensioner, the surviving spouse is entitled to a lifetime benefit 
equal to 55% of the pensioner's reduced benefit.^
The surviving spouse of an employee who dies before retirement and 
who either: (a) has attained age 60 or more, or; (b) has attained at 
least age 55 and whose age plus service totals 85 or more, is entitled
^General Motors, Article II, Section 6(a)(2). 
^General Motors, Article II, Section 6(a)(2)(c).
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to a benefit equal to the amount she would have received had the
employee retired on the date of his death and had he exercised the
66survivors benefit option. A pre-retirement death benefit is thus 
automatically provided to an automobile worker.
B . Survivor Benefits in the Steel Industry
A steel worker may elect either of two survivor benefit options.
In either case, the option must be exercised at age 60 or five years
before the pension is payable. This rule may be waived and the option
exercised at a later date (but before actual retirement) upon submis-
67
sion of satisfactory eviden.ce of good health.
Under one of the options, an employee may chose to receive a
reduced regular pension payable in an unchanging amount for so long
as either the pensioner or his designated beneficiary shall live.
The second option allows the employee to chose a reduced regular
pension payable during his lifetime, with the provision that after
his death one-half of such amount shall be payable during the life of
68
his designated beneficiary.
The amount by which the pension otherwise payable is reduced as a 
result of exercising either of these options is based on actuarial
69
tables which are adopted "from time to time" by the Pension Board.
^Ford, Section 7(a).
^Inland, Section II, Paragraph 11(a).
^^Jones and Laughlin, Section II, Paragraph 11(a). 
69Bethlehem, Section II, Paragraph 11(j).
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None of the steel industry plans provide pre-retirement death
benefits to survivors. Even if a steel worker elects one of the above
options and dies prior to retirement, the "election shall cease to be
of any effect, and the co-pensioner shall not be entitled to any pay-
70
ments by reason of the election of such option."
C. Survivor Benefits in the Rubber Indus try
A rubber worker is entitled to two types of survivor benefits.
One, a five-year term certain benefit, is automatic and requires no 
election by the employee. The other, similar to steel industry 
survivor benefits, must be elected in writing before retirement.
The five-year term certain clause provides that the monthly 
benefit payable to a retiree (whether regular, early, or disability) 
shall be payable for a minimum of five years. Should the retired 
employee die during the five-year period, the remaining monthly pen­
sion payments are made to his designated beneficiary or to his
71
estate should his beneficiary be dead. The pension payable under 
this five-year term certain provision is in an unreduced amount.
The rubber worker may also elect either of two survivor benefit 
options. These options must be elected at least three years before 
retirement, except that a later election is possible upon submission 
of evidence of good health to the Pension Board.
One of the options allows an employee to elect an actuarially 
reduced pension which shall continue payable for so long as either he
Jones and Laughlin, Section II, Paragraph 11(f).
71
U. S. Rubber, Section B, Paragraph 4.
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or his designated beneficiary shall live. The second option provides
that at the death of the pensioner, his beneficiary shall continue to
receive a benefit equal to one-half of his actuarially reduced 
72pension.
Rubber industry pension plans make no provision for pre-retirement 
death benefits.
D. Survivor and Pre-Retirement Death Benefits in the Petroleum 
Refining Indus try
Gulf Oil Corporation allows an employee to select either of three 
survivor benefit options. The first allows an employee to chose a 
reduced pension payable during his lifetime and continuing in the same 
amount to his surviving joint annuitant. The second option provides 
for a reduced amount for the life of the pensioner, one-half of which 
amount is payable after his death to the designated beneficiary. The 
third option amounts to a five-year term certain pension. If this 
option is elected, the retiree receives a reduced benefit during his 
lifetime, but is assured a total payment equal to five times his annual 
unreduced retirement allowance. Should he die before receiving pay­
ments which equal this amount, the difference is paid in a lump sum to 
his beneficiary.
Should a Gulf employee die after electing any of these options
but before retiring, he is deemed to have retired on the day before
73
his death, with survivor benefits payable accordingly.
72Firestone, Section II, Paragraph 7.
73
Gulf, Section 6 (a).
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Any employee who dies before retirement and who is eligible for
either an early or normal retirement benefit shall be regarded as having
had, elected the five-year term certain option even though no option was
74
in fact exercised. This amounts to an automatic pre-retirement death 
benefit.
Shell Oil Company allows a regular or early retiree to provide a 
selected beneficiary with either a lifetime monthly benefit or a lump 
sum payment. Selection of either results in an actuarially reduced 
benefit to the retiree. Under the joint survivorship option, the 
pensioner may elect for his beneficiary to receive a monthly benefit 
equal to his own pension or any smaller monthly benefit which is a 
multiple of $10. The lump sum option allows a retiring employee to 
elect a lump sum payment to his survivor in any amount up to $1 ,0 0 0 .
Lump sum amounts in excess of this may be elected with approval of 
the Trustees. The lump sum option may be elected singly or in combin­
ation with the joint survivorship option.^ No pre-retirement death 
benefit is available under the Shell plan.
A plethora of options is available to an employee covered by the 
Sinclair plan. Except for the Social Security Adjustment Option, 
election must occur 3 years prior to retirement and not later than age
62. This time limit may be waived, however, upon presentation of
*
satisfactory evidence of good health.
^Gulf, Section 6 (b). 
^Shell, Section 3(3).
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The first option allows an employee to elect the usual joint and 
survivorship option. The survivors benefit may be in any amount equal 
to or less than the employee's actuarially reduced monthly benefit.
Only the spouse or a child of the employee can be designated as a bene­
ficiary, and death of the employee before benefit payments commence
7 6
renders the election null and void.
The second option is a ten-year term certain benefit, election
of which guarantees that 1 2 0 monthly benefit payments will be made.
Should a retiree die within ten years of his retirement date, the
remaining payments are payable to his beneficiary. This option is also
rendered null and void should the employee die before benefit payments 
77commence.
The third option available to a Sinclair employee is a Social 
Security adjustment option. Exercise of this option results in larger 
private plan benefits until the retiree becomes eligible for an unre­
duced Social Security benefit, at which time the private benefit is
7 0
reduced. This in itself is not a survivors benefit, as election of 
this option alone would create no rights for survivors. The employee 
may, however, make a dual election in the sense that the Social Security 
adjustment option may be elected in conjunction with either the joint 
and survivor option or the ten-year term certain option. Dual election 
results in the retiree's pension being first adjusted in accordance
7 fi
Sinclair, Section 8.2.




with the Soeial Security adjustment option and then reduced with the
applicable actuarial discount factor pertaining to the other option 
79elected. Tables for making these adjustments are provided in an 
appendix.
As the Sinclair plan is contributory and guarantees the return
of at least the participant's contributions plus interest, it has a
sort of built-in pre-retirement death benefit. The plan provides
that contributions plus interest may be returned to the survivor of
a dead participant either in a lump sum or in monthly installments
80
over a period of five years.
The Humble Oil and Refining Company's plan contains two types 
of survivor benefits. One of these benefits is a joint and survivor 
option, the other an automatic five-year certain payment.
Under the joint annuity option, an employee may elect to receive 
a reduced benefit for life on the condition that following his death 
a previously determined monthly amount will be payable to his 
designated joint annuitant. The amount payable to the joint annui­
tant, can be any amount equal to or less than the retiree's actuarially 
81
reduced benefit.
Failing the election of this option, should a pensioner die 
before receiving 60 monthly pension payments, monthly benefits shall
79Sinclair, Section 8.5. 
^Sinclair, Section 9.4. 
^Humble, Section 9.1.
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automatically continue to his survivor until a minimum of 60 payments 
82
have been made.
Should an Humble employee die before the commencement of retire­
ment benefits, no pension is payable, i.e., the plan provided no 
pre-retirement death benefit. (To the extent that an employee had 
contributed under an earlier contributory plan, these contributions 
plus interest are of course payable to survivors).
Financing Arrangements
Several matters pertaining to financing must be dealt with upon 
the establishment of a pension plan. Specifically, decisions must 
be made concerning: (a) who is to pay for the program; (b) whether 
obligations created by the plan shall be fully funded, met out of 
current revenue, or some combination of the two, and; (c) whether a 
covered employee shall gain a vested right to a benefit. The following 
is an examination of how these matters are treated in the several 
pension plans included in this study.
A. Contributory and Non-Contributory Plans
Insofar as industrial pension plans are concerned, the trend in 
the last several years has been toward the provision of pension 
benefits without direct cost to the employee. Of the plans contained 
in this study, only one, the Sinclair Oil Corporation's plan, requires 
that the employee contribute toward meeting the cost of his pension. 




non-contributory basis. The reasons for this movement to company 
financed plans have been discussed in Chapter III. The relative desir­
ability of non-contributory plans will be discussed in Chapter V. 
Suffice it to say here that a simple comparison of pension plans in the 
automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries reveals a 
near unanimous preference for the non-contributory type of plan, with 
the Sinclair plan as the only noted exception.
B . Funding
A pension plan may be "funded" to various degrees. At one extreme 
is the fully funded plan under which all accrued obligations could be 
met from the existing fund. A fully funded plan thus requires a fund 
which, with interim earnings, would be sufficient to pay lifetime 
benefits to those who have already retired as well as to cover any 
matured vested rights should the plan and payments into it be immed­
iately discontinued. At the other extreme is the pay-as-you-go plan 
under which pensions are paid out of current revenue. This arrange­
ment requires only that sufficient money be placed in the "fund" to pay 
currently due benefits. Discontinuance of the plan and payments into 
it would therefore result in an absolute deficiency of funds with 
which to meet accrued obligations.
Plans included in this study approach both of these extremes.
Some of them contain funding provisions which require that the plan be 
almost fully funded, while others merely require that pension payments 
be made when due. Practice is often more important than plan 
provisions, however, as in those cases in which a substantial fund is 
established even though no such fund is formally required by the plan.
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A mere reading of funding provisions may therefore be somewhat misleadr 
ing insofar as financial security is concerned.
1. Funding in the Automobile Industry
Pension plans in the automobile industry operate on what might be 
called a "modified fully funded" basis. These plans distinguish 
between past service costs, which is the cost of the obligations im­
mediately assumed when the plans went into effect in 1950, and normal 
cost, which is the cost of obligations which accrue with the passage of 
time.
When the plans were adopted, each firm assumed a full blown 
obligation to pay pensions to qualifying retirees. The motor companies 
could not possibly have been expected to fully fund all past service 
costs immediately. Accordingly, these plans allow a firm 30 years in 
which to fund the cost attributable to service before 1950. Any re­
vision in the benefit structure which substantially affects past service
83cost is also subject to this provision. Normal cost obligations are 
fully funded as they accrue. Thus, had the plans remained unchanged 
until 1980, the cost of all normal retirement benefits would have been 
fully funded.
Finally, the cost of the supplemental allowances which are payable 
in specialized retirement cases need not be funded at all. The firms 
are required only to meet these costs in such a way that "as of each
anniversary the balance in the fund attributable to the supplemental
84
allowances shall not be less than zero."
83j?ord, Section 5(a).
®^General Motors, Section 2(d).
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2. Funding in the Steel Industry
Funding in the steel industry may be roughly described as "fund- 
as-you-go," When a steel worker retires, an amount is placed in the 
pension fund which, on an actuarial basis, is sufficient to fully fund 
his benefit. No attempt is made to accumulate funds as workers accum­
ulate pension rights. A worker's pension is funded only when he 
actually retires. Thus, should payments into the fund cease, there 
would be sufficient funds to provide pensions to those who had already 
retired, but nothing to finance benefits to those who subsequently 
reached retirement age. Accordingly, at any given time, steel industry 
pension funds must contain an amount which "shall not be less than an 
amount which on a sound actuarial basis shall be estimated to be suf­
ficient to pay the pensions which shall have been granted under the 
85
pension plan...."
It would thus appear that funding in the steel industry, at least 
insofar as formal plan language is concerned, is on a somewhat less 
secure financial basis than the automobile industry, which accumulates 
pension funds on an accrual basis. The steel industry might be compared 
to a firm which replaces worn out capital equipment out of current 
revenue, while the automobile industry is analagous to a firm which 
accumulates depreciation reserves. There is evidence that some of the 
steel firms go beyond formal plan requirements in funding practices, 




3. Funding in the Rubber Industry
Funding practices in the rubber industry are practically identical 
to those of the steel industry, i.e., pensions are funded as they are 
granted with no accrual for accumulated service. Rubber firms are 
bound to place into a trust fund "an amount estimated on a sound actu­
arial basis to be sufficient to pay all pensions awarded at retirement
86under the pension plan."
4. Funding in the Petroleum Refining Indus try
Gulf Oil Corporation's retirement plan affords the widest possible 
leeway to the firm's Board of Directors insofar as funding is concerned. 
Once each year an actuary chosen by the Pension Committee submits an 
"actuarial valuation" to the Committee which in turn recommends to the 
firm's Board of Directors the contribution needed for the year. The
,87
Board may, however, "for any reason defer or reduce contributions-.
The report of the actuary is therefore only a guideline and is in no 
way binding on the Board. The Board is obligated only to make suf­
ficient annual contributions so as not to "reduce any annuitant's
88accrued benefits or affect the benefits to be paid under the plan."
It would be entirely possible for Gulf to finance its pension plan on 
a pure pay-as-you-go basis.
The Shell plan is on the same footing, forthrightly stating that 
contributions "shall be made at such times, in such manner, and in such
86




amounts as its Board of Directors, giving due consideration to accepted 
actuarial principles, shall deem advisable to provide the benefits of 
this plan.
Even though the Sinclair plan is contributory, the clause which
deals with company payments into the plan differs little from similar
clauses in the Gulf and Shell plans. Sinclair states that it "intends"
to pay into the trust fund amounts "needed in addition to contributions
of participants to provide the benefits payable under the Plan." The
payment of such amounts may be made "at such times and in such amounts
90
as the Company shall decide."
Sinclair estimates that a man retiring at age 62 would receive 
$10.62 for each dollar that he contributed. How much of this repre­
sents accrued earnings on employee contributions and how much is Company 
contribution, is not revealed.
Humble Oil Company's plan follows the general petroleum refining 
industry's pattern. It agrees to pay the full cost of the pension 
program, but leaves the timing and amount of company contributions up 
to the firm.
C. Vesting Provisions
Most pension plans provide that an employee who has met certain 
age and service requirements will be entitled to a deferred pension 
benefit even though he breaks service with the firm before becoming 




gains a vested right to a benefit payable, generally, upon the attain­
ment of age 65.
The questions that need to be asked about vesting provisions 
concern eligibility requirements, i.e., what age and service combina­
tion is qualifying, and how the deferred vested benefit is computed.
The industries and firms under study will be examined with these 
questions in mind.
1. Vesting in the Automobile Indus try
Recent amendments to vesting provisions in the automobile industry
have rendered these plans possibly the most liberal to be found.
Since September 1, 1964, any employee who is less than age 60 but who
has accumulated 10 years of credited service is eligible for a deferred
benefit if separated. The reason for the separation is irrelevant.
The pension is payable upon the attainment of age 65 in a monthly
amount equal to $4.25 for each year of service. Further, the former
employee may choose to commence receipt of pension payments at age 60,
in which case the monthly benefit is reduced by 6 / 1 0 of 1 percent for
91
each month that his age at commencement is less than 65. This 
amounts to a 7 .2% reduction for each year that the former employee's 
age is less than 65, or, a 36% reduction if payments commence at age 60.
The liberality of these provisions in relation to other industries 
rests in the fact that a deferred pension is payable: (a) after only 10 
years of service; (b) regardless of age at separation; (c) irrespective 
of the reason for separation, and; (d) as early as age 60,
91General Motors, Article VII, Section 2(c).
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2. Vesting in the Steel Industry
Vesting is available to a steel worker under rather restricted 
circumstances. To be eligible an employee must have reached age 40 
and must have 15 or more years of service when separation occurs. Even 
then, coverage is confined to those employees who are separated as a 
result of permanent shutdown or who have been laid off and not recalled 
within two years. A man who voluntarily separated or who was dis­
charged for cause would consequently be ineligible.
An employee who meets the eligibility requirements is entitled to 
a pension benefit upon the attainment of age 65. Except for the 13- 
week vacation payment, which is not payable, the deferred vested
pension is computed by use of the normal retirement benefit formula of
92
service multiplied by 1% of final compensation.
3. Vesting in the Rubber Indus try
A rubber worker who terminates employment after ten years of
service is eligible for a deferred vested pension providing he is at
least 40 years of age at separation. The reason for the separation is
irrelevant. The benefit payment commences at age 65 and is equal to
93
$3.25 times years of service. (This is the normal retirement 
formula).
In lieu of such deferred pension, a Firestone employee may accept 
a lump sum severance award equal to 1\ week's pay for each year of 
service up to 15 years. If the employee has 15 or more years of
^Inland, Section 1 (6 ) (a). 
^ B .  F. Goodrich, Article 2.3.
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service, the severance award is equal to 1% week's pay for each year of 
94
service. This particular option does not appear in other rubber in­
dustry plans.
4. Vesting in the Petroleum Refining Indus try
In spite of differences on other pension plan matters, the Gulf 
and Shell Oil Companies are in agreement on one thing; that rights to 
pension plan benefits do not vest. Thus, if a Gulf or Shell employee 
is not otherwise entitled to a benefit, termination results in loss of 
all pension claims, regardless of attained age and service. This is 
not a matter of actual plan provisions, but simply the absence of 
provisions which provide benefits under conditions other than early, 
disability, or normal retirement.
A Sinclair employee who breaks service for any reason except re­
tirement gains a vested right to a pension benefit, provided he does 
not withdraw his own contributions from the plan. If he has less than 
ten year's service, the pension amount is an actuarially determined 
annuity based on his own contributions. If he has exactly ten years of 
service he is entitled, at age 65.,, to an additional annuity (over and 
above his own contributions) equal to 50% of normal annuity benefits, 
with the percentage increasing by 5% for each additional year of
service up to a maximum of 20 years. This additional annuity is, of
95
course, paid out of company contributions.
94
Firestone, Article VII, Paragraph 11.
95
Sinclair, Section 10.1 (a)(ii).
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It thus appears that ten years of service entitles a Sinclair
employee to a 50% vested right, which percentage increased by 5% until
a fully vested right is gained after 20 years of service. The age of
the employee at termination is irrelevant.
Whatever percent of a normal annuity is vested, the former
employee may choose to begin receipt of his benefit as early as age
55. His benefit is reduced by 5%, however, for each year that his
96
age at commencement is less than 65.
An Humble employee gains a fully vested annuity after 10 years 
of service, regardless of age at termination. This right is voided, 
however, should he withdraw contributions made under a former plan.
The benefit is computed by use of the normal retirement benefit
97
formula (1.670 x service x final pay), and is payable at age 65.
This section on vesting concludes the analysis of actual 
pension plan provisions. The following Chapter summarizes the 
findings and conclusions arrived at during the course of this study.
^Sinclair, Section 10.1(b).
97Humble Oil and Refining Company, Summary of Benefit Plan 
Changes, December 31, 1965.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From a slow and halting beginning, industrial pension plan coverage 
has been dramatically expanded and revised. Despite the fact that the 
nation had been through a series of economic, political, social, and 
international upheavals, expansion in pension plan coverage appears 
to have followed a steady course until the mid-1940s. The first in­
dustrial pension plan was established by a felt manufacturer, Alfred 
Dolge, in 1882. By 1929, 139 manufacturers had pension plans. By 
1938, this number had grown to 238, and by 1940, to 437. During 
these early decades, it appears that pension plan expansion followed 
its own slow but inexorable course despite the expansionist attitude 
at the turn of the century, World War I, the prosperity of the 
roaring 1920s, or the suffocating depression of the 1930s. The great 
transformation came during the late 1940s and early 1950s as the 
result of a number of new elements within the economy.
World War II brought with it economic and political conditions 
which were highly conducive to pension plan expansion. The manpower 
shortage and competition among firms for employees in conjunction 
with the wage freeze acted to stimulate the use of fringe benefits 
as a means of attracting and holding manpower. The nation's blue 
collar workers soon found themselves enjoying perquisites formerly 
reserved for industry's upper echelons. In general, the growth of 
fringe benefits received the blessings of the National War Labor
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Board, whose responsibility it was to hold the line on wage rates.
Until the late 1940s, labor unions gave scant attention to 
pensions in contract negotiation, the general assumption being 
that it was the prerogative of management to grant or withhold such 
benefits. The United Mine Workers, with John L. Lewis as president, 
was the pioneer in introducing pensions to the collective bargain­
ing table in 1946, when the mine operators agreed to establish a 
pension fund by setting aside 5<? for each ton of coal mined. The 
real breakthrough came, however, in the 1949 Inland Steel Case 
when the National Labor Relations Board ruled that pensions were 
a bargainable issue under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
By 1963, it was estimated that 22,000 industrial pension plans 
were in operation, most of them included in collective bargaining 
agreements.
Provisions in the earliest pension plans were quite simple, 
generally setting forth only eligibility requirements and the 
pension amount. Those in operation today tend to be rather lengthy 
documents which spell out in detail how a wide range of contin­
gencies and alternatives shall be handled. Even so, these provisions 
can be placed in four general classifications: (1) those dealing
with administration of the plan; (2) those dealing with eligibility 
requirements; (3) benefit formulae, and; (4) financing arrangements.
Insofar as administration is concerned, there is considerable 
inter-industry diversity, and, in some industries, appreciable 
intra-industry variations. Of the four industries included in this
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study, only the automobile industry provides for joint administration 
by management and labor. Any dispute arising under the plans con­
cerning eligibility and pension amount is referred to a six member 
board which is made up of three company appointed members and three 
union appointed members. Deadlocks are referred to a mutually 
acceptable impartial chairman who may vote in the case of a tie.
Plan administration in the steel industry is by the firm. Decisions 
concerning an employee's right to a pension may be challenged, 
however, and subjected to a special two-step grievance procedure 
which culminates in arbitration before an impartial umpire. In 
the final analysis, administration in the steel industry differs 
from the automobile industry more in form than in results. The 
rubber industry is quite similar to the steel industry, except 
that disagreements are settled by resort to the regular grievance 
procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement. In 
the petroleum refining industry, administration is by the firm, 
whose determination is conclusive. Where an appeal is allowed by 
one of these plans, it amounts to no more than a request that the 
decision be reviewed.
Eligibility requirements for a normal retirement benefit in 
the automobile, steel, rubber, and petroleum refining industries 
may be summarized as follows:
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Table V-l. Eligibility Requirements.




Petroleum Refining: 65 10
Gulf 65 No minimum
Sinclair 62 No minimum
Shell 65 15
Humble 65 15
^The right to participate in this plan is reserved to employees with 
one or more years of service.
In general, years of service in all industries is coterminous 
with seniority. Time spent on leaves of absence, military service 
(up to 4 years), sickness, and disability is commonly counted as
credited service.
Considerable diversity exists among industries and firms insofar
as normal retirement benefits are concerned. The normal retirement
benefit to which a man with 30 years of service and average monthly
earnings of $550 would be entitled in each of the industries and
firms is summarized in Table V-2.









^Computation based on the assumption that the retiree has 30 years 
of service, average earnings~~of $550 per month, and has reached 
normal retirement age.
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Some form of early, special early, or disability retirement is 
provided in most industrial pension plans. Early retirement pro­
visions allow a qualified employee to elect retirement before reaching 
normal retirement age, in some cases as early as age 55. Election of 
the early retirement option always results in a reduction in the 
monthly benefit. The most liberal early retirement benefit is 
provided by the automobile industry, which guarantees up to 70% of 
pre-retirement earnings for a 30-year man between the ages of 60 
and 65. Early retirement benefits to which employees under the plans 
studied would be entitled, assuming various age, service, and 
earnings combinations, are presented in Table IV-1 of Chapter IV.
Special early retirement is provided by the automobile, steel, 
and rubber industries. Though eligibility requirements differ 
somewhat between these industries, a worker otherwise qualified may 
be placed on special early retirement at the request of the firm 
or under mutually satisfactory conditions. The benefit of a special 
early retireee is normally greater than the benefit payable to a 
regulqr early retiree of equal age and service. In the rubber 
industry for instance, a special early retiree age 55 with 30 years 
of service would receive $195 monthly. A regular early retiree 
similarly situated would receive a monthly benefit of $65.74. None 
of the petroleum refining plans included in this study provided for 
special early retirement.
All of the pension plans studied provided for some form of 
disability retirement. In many of these, eligibility requirements 
are lower than for other forms of specialized retirement. Indeed,
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age at the onset of the disability is immaterial under some of the 
plans. Under those plans which provide for special early retirement, 
the disability benefit is the same as the special early benefit for 
similarly situated employees. The steel industry guarantees a minimum 
disability benefit of $100 per month which applies if the benefit 
formula yields a smaller amount. In the petroleum refining industry, 
which does not have special early retirement provisions, the benefit 
for a disabled worker is usually computed in the same way as for a 
regular early retiree, but is unreduced for age. The Shell plan 
guarantees a disability benefit that is at least 25% of final com­
pensation, and the Humble plan sets the minimum at 37%% of pay.
All of the pension plans included in this study contained some 
form of survivor or pre-retirement death benefit. A survivor 
benefit is payable to the beneficiary of an employee who dies after 
retirement. Pre-retirement death benefits are payable to the 
beneficiary of an employee whd dies before retirement. Survivor 
benefits are usually optional with the employee, and, when elected, 
result in a reduction of the primary benefit. Such an option is 
available in one form or another in every plan included in this 
study. Generally, pre-retirement death benefits are payable to 
survivors of employees who have satisfied eligibility requirements 
for early retirement but who are still working at the time of death.
In the automobile industry, the benefit is equal to the amount 
which would have been payable had the employee elected the survivors 
benefit option and retired on the date of his death. Pre-retirement 
death benefits are not available in either the steel or the rubber
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industry. In the petroleum refining industry, only Gulf offers a 
true pre-retirement death benefit. A five-year term certain benefit 
is guaranteed an employee who has established eligibility for either 
normal or early retirement. The Sinclair plan, which is contributory, 
provides that the employee's contribution-plus interest will be 
returned to the survivor of an employee who dies before retirement.
This could hardly be regarded as a pre-retirement death benefit, 
however.
Several matters pertaining to financing must be dealt with in 
a pension plan. A plan may be contributory or non-contributory; it 
may be funded or unfunded; and pension rights may or may not vest.
Insofar as payments into the plan are concerned, the great 
majority of industrial pension plans are financed on a non-contributory 
basis, i.e., the firm meets the full cost of the plan. Of the 
several plans analyzed herein, only one, the Sinclair Corporation's 
plan, is financed on a contributory basis. Some observations con­
cerning the relative merits of contributory and non-contributory 
plans appear later in this chapter.
Irrespective of who is to bear the cost of a pension plan, a 
decision must be made concerning what portion of the cost is to be 
met out of current contributions and what part is to be met out of 
previously accumulated funds. A plan may be fully funded in the 
sense that the accumulated fund would be sufficient to meet all 
matured obligations should the plan and contributions into it be 
immediately terminated, or, it may operate on a pure pay-as-you-go 
basis, in which case the "fund" is never larger than the amount
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necessary to pay currently due benefits. The plans examined in the 
course of this study approach both extremes. Automobile industry 
plans operate on a fully funded basis insofar as normal retirement 
benefits are concerned, except for pension obligations assumed at the 
inception of the plans and any additional obligations assumed by 
virtue of revision of the benefit structure. The companies have 30 
years in which to fund obligations arising from either of these 
causes. An unrevised plan would therefore be fully funded after 30 
years of operation.
Funding provisions in the steel and rubber industries require 
that upon the retirement of an employee an amount be placed in the 
pension fund which would be actuarially sufficient to pay a lifetime 
benefit to him. Should one of these plans and contributions into it 
be discontinued, the fund would be sufficient to pay benefits to 
those who had already retired, but would contain no monies for those 
who had qualified for a pension or vested right but had not actually 
retired.
Pension plans in the petroleum refining industry allow the con­
tributing firm considerable leeway insofar as funding is concerned. 
Typically, contributions are made at such times and in such amounts 
as firm officials deem advisable. Although an actuary's assessment 
of the financial condition of the plans is commonly required, funding 
provisions are written so that such an assessment acts only as a 
guideline and is in no way binding on the firm. Basically, each of 
these plans guarantees only that benefits will be paid when due.
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Most pension plans provide that an employee who meets certain 
age and service requirements will be entitled to a deferred pension 
even though he separates before becoming eligible for either a normal 
or early retirement benefit. Such deferred vested benefits are 
commonly payable at age 65, and are usually computed by use of the 
normal retirement benefit formula.
Of the plans included in this study, the.automobile industry 
plans are the most liberal insofar as vesting is concerned. A worker 
in that industry gains a vested right to a benefit after ten years 
of service, regardless of age at separation. Also, the reason for 
separation is irrelevant, and the benefit is payable as early as 
age 60.
In the steel industry, a worker must have attained the age of
40 and must have accumulated 15 or more years of service before
pension rights vest. A worker who is separated for cause or who 
separates voluntarily is not eligible for a vested benefit. Also, 
the 13-week vacation benefit which is payable to a normal retiree is
not payable to a man who qualifies for a vested benefit.
A rubber worker who terminates after ten years of service is 
eligible for a vested pension providing he is at least 40 years of 
age at separation. As in the automobile industry, the reason for 
separation is irrelevant.
Neither Gulf nor Shell provide pension benefits under conditions 
other than early, disability, or normal retirement. Thus, if an 
employee is not qualified for a benefit under one or more of these 
conditions, separation results in loss of all pension rights,
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regardless of age and service at separation.
After ten years of service, a Sinclair employee is entitled to a 
benefit equal to 50% of a normal retirement annuity, with the.per­
centage increasing by 5% for each additional year until a fully vested 
right is gained after 20 years of service. Age of the employee at 
separation is not relevant.
An Humble employee gains a fully vested pension right after ten 
years of service, regardless of age at separation. The benefit is 
payable at age 65 and is computed by use of the normal retirement 
benefit formula.
In analyzing employee benefit programs, caution must be exer­
cised in making inter-industry and inter-firm comparisions when 
pension plans alone are the basis upon which the comparison is made. 
Pensions are only one of the many fringe benefits which may be 
afforded by an employer-employee relationship. Not only may benefits 
in other areas compensate for a weak pension plan, but they may also 
provide benefits to a retired employee which closely approximate 
pension benefits. Stock purchase plans, paid up li-fe insurance, and 
matching savings plans are all of this nature. In essence then, the 
comparisons and conclusions contained herein pertain to pension plan 
coverage only, and not to the overall employee benefit program of an 
industry or firm.
If pension plans are to be judged on the basis of benefits pay­
able to qualifying employees, plans in the automobile industry are 
generally superior to those found in other industries. Insofar as 
normal retirement benefits are concerned, a low-wage worker would
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enjoy a distinct advantage over a steel or rubber worker of similar 
service. A 30-year man making $350 per month would receive a monthly 
benefit of $75.50 in the steel industry, $97.50 in the rubber in­
dustry, and $127.50 in the automobile industry. In the petroleum 
refining industry, only Sinclair's plan would provide more at $157.50. 
For higher paid employees, however, the automobile worker would fare
J
less well than a steel worker or an employee in the petroleum 
refining industry. Benefits in these industries are computed on the 
basis of a service times percent of earnings formula whereas benefits 
in the automobile industry are computed by multiplying service by a 
fixed dollar amount.
An automobile worker is likely to enjoy a substantial advantage 
over workers in other industries if he accepts or is placed on 
specialized retirement (early, special early, and disability). A 
long service automobile worker retired under these conditions would 
receive a benefit greater than that available to a worker covered by 
any other plan included in this study. The Sinclair and Humble plans 
provide specialized benefits which exceed automobile industry benefits 
only when the worker has both short service and high earnings.
Finally, the automobile industry provides more liberal vesting 
and funding provisions than any other industry or firm analyzed. In 
addition, it is the only industry which provides for an automatic 
pre-retirement death benefit.
The Sinclair Oil Corporation's plan provides the highest normal 
retirement benefits of all the plans included in this study.
Specialized retirement benefits are greater in the automobile industry,
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and, in some cases, under the Humble plan. Except for funding and 
pre-retirement death benefit provisions, the Sinclair plan ranks 
roughly on par with the automobile industry.
The Humble Oil Corporation's plan compares favorably with the 
Sinclair plan in all areas except normal retirement benefits. For 
various age, service, and pay combinations, the monthly benefit 
under the Humble plan is generally $60 to $80 less than that available 
under the Sinclair plan.
The Shell Oil Company's plan strikes the median between the 
strongest and the weakest of the plans studied. It is superior to 
the Gulf, steel, and rubber plans insofar as most normal and 
specialized retirement benefits are concerned. A major weakness is 
its lack of a vesting provision. . Comparatively, this is not as much 
of a disadvantage as it might appear because of the weakness of 
vesting provisions in those plans which contain them.
The Gulf Oil Corporation's plan pays larger normal retirement 
benefits than either the rubber or steel industries. In some cases 
the rubber industry pays higher specialized retirement benefits.
Except for its lack of a vesting provision, the Gulf plan appears 
to be somewhat superior and, as indicated earlier, the vesting pro­
visions of the rubber and steel industries promise more than they 
deliver.
It is difficult to choose between the rubber and steel industry 
plans. Out of the nine different service and pay combinations for 
which normal retirement benefits were computed (see Table IV-3, p. 126), 
the rubber industry paid the highest benefit in six cases. It also
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pays the highest specialized retirement benefit for most age, service, 
and pay combinations. Steel industry plans appear to be the least 
effective of all the plans included in this study.
Inter-industry and inter-firm ranking of pension plans is a most 
difficult business. The three primary determinants of pension bene­
fits, i.e., age, service, and rate of compensation, are given 
different weight by each plan. The benefit amount of a retiree 
therefore depends upon the weight that is given to the determinant 
in which his position is strongest. Anyone who attempts to evaluate 
and compare pension plans is immediately brought face to face with 
the fact that each plan stresses the determinant which is most 
acceptable to the contracting parties involved.
However tenuous an attempt at ranking may be, decisions must 
be made in the establishment and amendment of pension plans. These 
decisions must be based on an understanding of what each clause in 
a plan does and does not do.. It is with this in mind that the pension 
plans analyzed herein are ranked as follows:
1. Automobile industry
2. Sinclair Oil Corporation
3. Humble Oil Corporation
4. Shell Oil Company
5. Gulf Oil Corporation
6. Rubber industry
7. Steel industry
Several rather pronounced trends have been noted in the course of 
this study which deserve comment insofar as their general nature and 
desirability are concerned.
First, the trend toward non-contributory pension plans appears 
somewhat questionable. As non-contributory plans are favored by
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virtually the entire labor movement and by. a growing number of 
employers, the counter-arguments which follow apply to most industrial 
pension plans in existence today.
Unions have made much of contract negotiations in which contribu­
tory plans have been placed on a non-conbributory basis. If package 
bargaining is as prevalent as advertised, these unions are delivering 
much less than the membership is led to believe. If the plan con­
version is made in lieu of a basic wage increase, the membership 
gains only a small tax advantage, a considerable portion of which 
will later be recouped by the Internal Revenue Service from pension 
benefits. It is the view of the writer that unions have oversold 
non-contributory plans and that all parties involved have given undue 
weight to the tax advantage achieved. In fact, the present practice 
of making only employer contributions tax deductible is open to 
question. A tax law could certainly be devised to allow for employee 
contributions on a tax deductible basis. The self-employed have 
enjoyed this right for several years. The feared abuse by over- 
contributing should not be too difficult to prevent.
Another point, previously discussed, needs only to be mentioned 
here. Pension benefits are necessarily greater when employer contri­
butions are matched to some extent by bona-fide employee contributions.
Finally, union and employee claims to certain rights are 
strengthened by the fact that a plan is contributory. A Union 
certainly has a stronger argument for participation in pension fund 
administration if the fund is partially created by contributions by
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its membership. Further, as indicated earlier, liberal vesting pro­
visions are much more prevalent under contributory plans.
Summing up, a hard-headed examination seems to favor contributory 
plans. A change in the tax laws which have encouraged the adoption of 
non-contributory plans would possibly reverse the trend.
Another problem which deserves serious consideration is the 
problem created by the magnitude of pension trust funds, the size of 
which will soon surpass the $100 billion mark. The rate of growth 
is rapid, and there is no discernible limit in sight. The economic 
ramifications inherent in the control of this vast aggregation of 
highly liquid and mobile purchasing power are myriad. Present 
federal statutes are designed to protect the interests of benefici­
aries only, leaving most investment decisions to trustees. These 
trustees are generally answerable to a firm, even though the firm 
cannot claim legal title to the funds. A firm or group of trustees 
are thus allowed to exercise all the rights of ownership over stocks 
and bonds which are purchased with pension funds. This amounts to 
control without ownership or even direct legal liability. The 
possibilities of abuse of such a position or misuse of funds are 
quite evident. The fact that the abuses thus far detected have in­
volved trade union controlled funds is no argument that corporations 
do not or will not engage in similar practices.
Volumes could be written on possible safeguards or solutions 
to the problems created by the existence of these billions of dollars 
being held in trust. It is sufficient here to draw attention to the 
fact that there is a problem and to state that the source of the
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problem - pension trust funds - is destined to increase in magnitude 
in coming years.
Another area in which considerable improvement could easily be 
made is in vesting provisions. As currently constituted, these 
provisions afford no protection to the mass of the nation's in­
dustrial labor force for the simple reason that most workers cannot 
satisfy the age or service requirements which are prerequisites to 
the gaining of a vested right. Indeed, under present plans, once a 
worker is old enough and has accumulated sufficient service with a 
firm to qualify for vesting, the likelihood of his separation is 
remote.
In the writer's view, immediate full vesting should be practiced 
by American industry. Package bargaining indicates that contribu­
tions to pension funds are often in lieu of wage increases, a fact 
which gives the worker a strong claim to immediate full vesting.
Such a system would also alleviate several problems which have come 
to be associated with pensions.
First, an adequate pension for every retiree would be much more 
certain. A dollar placed in a pension fund at age 25 yields a much 
gt-eater benefit than a dollar placed at age 55. Too, there would 
obviously be more funded dollars of all "ages" for a mobile worker.
Secondly, it is well known that many firms refuse to hire older 
workers because of the pension obligation which must be assumed.
It ia costly to provide a lifetime pension to an individual after 
only ten or fifteen years of service. The employment problems of 
the older worker, i.e., the worker over 45 years of age, have been
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the subject of extensive public and private investigation. The writer 
submits that the difficulty would be substantially eliminated if 
vesting provisions in American industry were revised to provide im­
mediate full vesting. This would spread the cost of a pension over 
all of a worker's employers, thereby substantially relieving the last 
employer of an obligation which he is understandably reluctant to 
assume under the present system.
Finally, the mobility of the nation's labor force would be 
enhanced by such a system. A flexible and mobile labor force will 
become more and more a necessity as the nation's economy becomes 
more dynamic. The technological explosion in products and methods 
of production is certain to create an environment in which constant 
reallocation of labor resources will be needed. This reallocation 
must be fast and efficient if we are to avoid a rapidly growing body 
of the frictionally and technologically unemployed. The continuing 
attachment of excess workers to the coal mining industry because of 
reluctance to forfeit pension rights is illustrative of the misallo- 
cation problem which can spring from a non-vesting pension system.
Difficulties connected with pension fund transfers would 
admittedly be present, but hardly insurmountable. Several methods 
of handling vested funds are available. Funds created by each 
employer could simply remain in trust until retirement of the worker, 
at which time application could be made for a benefit from each fund. 
Alternately, the individual funds could be transferred to a central 
trust at retirement age. Under either of these systems, the con­
tributing firm would retain control of the funds until the worker
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retired. Possibly a simpler and more direct solution would be the 
creation of a clearinghouse into which vested funds would be trans­
ferred immediately upon separation of an employee. Such a device 
would avoid the creation of multiple trusts for a single worker, 
but might be opposed by employers faced with loss of control over 
pension funds.
The problem, however, is not so much how vested funds are to 
be administered, as it is to develop pension plans in which vesting 
is a reality rather than a promise. To secure vesting provisions 
which actually result in vested pension rights is a legitimate goal 
for organized labor.
Notice has previously been taken of the needlessly obscure 
provisions in some of the plans studied. The automobile industry 
plans and the Humble Oil Corporation's plans are especially abstruse 
in some of their specialized retirement provisions. It is doubtful 
that one percent of the employees covered by these plans could 
compute their own early retirement benefit. The content of these 
provisions could easily be more clearly expressed as in fact they 
are in many other plans.
The divorcement of private plan benefits from OASDI benefits 
would clarify some of the plans. The early retirement provision 
of the Humble plan follows an elaborate procedure whereby public 
benefits are initially included in the computed benefit and then 
partially or wholly removed. Steel industry plans provide for a 
maximum $80 OASDI offset against normal retirement benefits. Any 
worker who has satisfied the requirements for normal retirement is
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virtually certain to have become eligible for at least an $80 OASDI 
benefit. The offset has consequently become automatic and anachronis­
tic. There is simply no justification for including an amount in the 
private plan benefit which must be subtracted out as a matter of 
course. The practice is more than useless; it gives the impression 
that it was calculated to deceive.
Some of the points emphasized in this critique may appear 
trivial in light of the tremendous forward strides which industrial 
pension plans have made since the 1950s. The intention of the writer, 
however, was to point out existing weaknesses, and not to denigrate 
a movement which will doubtlessly redound to the benefit of millions 
of retiring workmen. Even after giving due allowance for the inac­
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